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MUNICIPAL LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO
INVESTIGATE CITIZEN COMPLAINTS
AGAINST POLICE
Hazel Glenn Beh*
Formalism is often the last refuge of scoundrels; history teaches
us that the most tyrannical regimes, from Pinochet's Chile to
Stalin's Soviet Union, are theoretically those with the most de-
veloped legal procedures. The point is obviously not to tar the
Police Department's good name with disreputable associations,
but only to illustrate that we cannot look to the mere existence
of superficial grievance procedures as a guarantee that citizens'
constitutional liberties are secure. Protection of citizens' rights
and liberties depends upon the substance of the [citizen com-
plaint] investigatory procedures.'
I. Introduction
In City of Canton v. Harris,2 the United States Supreme Court
announced that a municipality could be liable under Chapter 42,
Section 1983 of the United States Code3 for the misconduct of an
employee if deficiencies in a municipal training program were the
moving force behind plaintiff's injury and the alleged municipal de-
ficiencies were the result of a deliberate indifference to training
police officers. In adopting the deliberate indifference standard,
the Court explained that "a lesser standard of fault would result in
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1. Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 974 (3d Cir. 1996) (reversing summary
judgment in favor of city, evidence creates a jury question), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
1086 (1997).
2. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), originally enacted as section 1 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13, provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
4. See Canton, 489 U.S. at 391.
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de facto respondeat superior liability"5 and would cause federal
courts to engage in an endless exercise of second-guessing munici-
pal-employee training programs."'6 The Court warned that the fed-
eral courts were "ill suited to undertake" such a review and to do
so "would implicate serious questions of federalism."'7 In her con-
curring and dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor warned litigants
that § 1983 is not intended to serve as a "'federal good government
act' for municipalities. '"8 Nevertheless, lower courts instantly ex-
panded liability under Canton to include, not just the failure-to-
train, but also the failure of other municipal programs which cause
constitutional injury to citizens.
The Court, in Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County
v. Brown,9 recently reaffirmed its willingness to permit federal in-
quiry into the deficiencies of municipal programs which result in
constitutional injuries. The deeply divided Court again warned,
however, that the federal courts should not micromanage munici-
pal programs and decisionmaking through the hammer of civil
rights liability. 10
Following Canton, the method in which a municipality addresses
citizen complaints against police officers has become the frequent
focus of civil rights litigation." Federal courts have signaled that a
municipality must systematically address citizen complaints as a
part of its responsibility to manage and supervise its police of-
ficers.2 A municipality's failure to institute adequate procedures
to air citizen complaints may demonstrate deliberate indifference
which gives rise to civil rights liability. 13 Federal judicial decisions
reveal the type of response to civilian complaints of police miscon-
duct the courts expect from municipalities. Adverse decisions pro-
vide municipalities with notice of a judicial willingness to evaluate
procedures for reviewing police misconduct complaints. These
5. Id. at 392; see also Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S.
658 (1978) (holding that there is no municipal respondeat superior liability in civil
rights claims).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 396 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
9. 117 S. Ct. 1382 (1997).
10. See id. at 1394.
11. One of the first cases was Fiacco v. Rensselaer, 783 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 480 U.S. 922 (1987), cited with approval in Canton for employing a delib-
erate indifference standard. See Canton, 489 U.S. at 387 n.6, 389 n.7.
12. See infra part IV.
13. Of course, municipal liability first turns on establishing that plaintiff suffered a
constitutional injury at the hands of a government official. See City of Los Angeles v.
Heller, 475 U.S. 796 (1986).
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procedures fall within the limits of judicial oversight prescribed by
Canton and Brown.14
A claim that the citizen complaint process shows deliberate in-
difference is different than a claim that the amount of complaints
lodged or incidences of misconduct indicate a custom or policy
under Monell v. New York Department of Social Services.15 Similar
14. Liability or potential liability found: Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966 (3d
Cir. 1996) .(judgment as a matter of law reversed; question of fact whether Pitts-
burgh's investigatory procedures against officers were adequate), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 1086 (1997); Vann v. City of New York, 72 F.3d 1040 (2d Cir. 1995) (summary
judgment reversed; question of fact whether police system showed deliberate indiffer-
ence in monitoring complaints); Parrish v. Luckie, 963 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1992) (jury
verdict against North Little Rock, Arkansas affirmed); Gentile v. County of Suffolk,
926 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1991) (verdict against county affirmed); Bordanaro v. McLeod,
871 F.2d 1151 (1st Cir. 1989) (verdict affirmed, City of Everett, Massachusetts, liable),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 820 (1989); Fiacco v. City of Rensselaer, 783 F.2d 319 (2d Cir.
1986) (verdict against Rensselaer, New York, affirmed), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 922
(1987); Gonsalves v. City of New Bedford, 939 F. Supp. 915 (D. Mass. 1996) (imposing
municipal liability on City Council and Mayor); Hogan v. Franco, 896 F. Supp. 1313
(N.D.N.Y. 1995) (summary judgment in favor of Utica, New York, denied); Illiano v.
Clay Township, 892 F. Supp. 117 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (Clay Township's motion to dismiss
denied); Carney v. White, 843 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Wis. 1994) (Village of Darien's sum-
mary judgment denied), affd, 60 F.3d 1273 (7th Cir. 1995); Cox v. District of Colum-
bia, 821 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1993) (verdict against Washington, D.C.), affd, 40 F.3d
475 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Brown v. City of Margate, 842 F. Supp. 515 (S.D. Fla. 1993)
(Margate, Florida's summary judgment denied), affd, 56 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1995);
Bosley v. Foster, No. Civ. A. 90-2409-L, 1992 WL 40696, at *1 (D. Kan. Feb. 5, 1992)
(summary judgment in favor of Kansas City); Curran v. City of Boston, 777 F. Supp.
116 (D. Mass. 1991) (Boston's motion to dismiss denied); Vasquez v. Reid, No. 90 C.
1585, 1990 WL 207456, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 1990) (Chicago's motion to dismiss
denied); Sango v. City of New York, No. 83 CV 5177, 1989 WL 86995, at *1 (E.D.N.Y.
July 25, 1989) (New York's summary judgment denied).
No liability or potential for liability: Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069 (8th Cir. 1996)
(summary judgment in favor of North Sioux City, South Dakota affirmed); Searcy v.
City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282 (6th Cir. 1994) (affirming summary judgment, no evidence
that failure to investigate past misconduct caused injury); Wilson v. City of Chicago, 6
F.3d 1233 (7th Cir. 1993) (no municipal liability for inadequate investigation of mis-
conduct although investigations inadequate, no deliberate indifference); Vukadi-
novich v. Zentz, 995 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1993) (affirming jury verdict in favor of City of
Valparaiso, no evidence investigation of police misconduct was inadequate); Brooks v.
D.R. Scheib, 813 F.2d 1191 (11th Cir. 1987) (verdict against Atlanta reversed, lack of
citizen participation in review of misconduct does not show deliberate indifference);
Sarus v. Rotundo, 831 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1987); Evans v. Avery, No. Civ. A. 94-10194-
WGY, 1995 WL 170056, at *1 (D. Mass. Mar. 14, 1995), affd 100 F.3d 1033 (1st Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1693 (1997); Schuurman v. Town of Nor Reading, No.
Civ. A. 90-10692-MLW, 1995 WL 464915, at *1 (D. Mass. June 15, 1995) (North Read-
ing's motion for summary judgment granted); Chudzik v. City of Wilmington, 809 F.
Supp. 1142 (D. Del. 1992) (summary judgment granted); Taylor v. Canton, Ohio Po-
lice Dep't, 544 F. Supp. 783 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (no city liability).
15. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Monell holds that a municipality may be liable for its
unconstitutional policies and customs. Id. at 690-91.
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to an allegation that the number of past complaints evidences a
policy or custom of abusive conduct, a deliberate indifference claim
also relies upon evidence of past citizen complaints. In a deliberate
indifference case, however, plaintiffs allege that the failure to de-
velop a comprehensive system to review citizen complaints
amounts to deliberate indifference to a municipality's obligation to
supervise employees. This allegation exposes municipalities to civil
rights liability without regard to the number of citizen complaints
received. With such an allegation, courts do not ask whether the
number of complaints evidences a custom or policy of abuse. In-
stead, courts ask whether the municipality's complaint procedure is
so deficient as to amount to deliberate indifference to the need to
supervise officers.
Parts II and III briefly describe the emerging professionalism of
law enforcement and, within this context, discuss the risks and ben-
efits associated with current models for receiving and reviewing cit-
izen complaints against police officers. Part IV discusses courts'
The claim that the existence of past complaints of police misconduct alone proves a
municipal custom or policy of misconduct is difficult to prove based upon the mere
numbers of complaints received. See, e.g., Carter v. District of Columbia, 795 F.2d
116, 126, 133 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that the number of complaints alone is insuffi-
cient to prove a custom or policy of abuse); Sarus v. Rotundo, 831 F.2d 397, 401-02
(2d Cir. 1987) (holding that past complaints are insufficient to prove custom or pol-
icy). Understandably, courts generally recognize that police officers are vulnerable to
unfounded claims of abuse. See Brooks v. Scheib, 813 F.2d 1191, 1194 (11th Cir. 1987)
(holding that officers working in high crime areas are likely subject to higher numbers
of complaints). The need to balance competing interests has led the Court to adopt
qualified immunity for individual officers. See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229
(1991) (holding that qualified immunity "gives ample room for mistaken judgments")
(quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343 (1986)); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 638 (1987) (stating that it is undesirable to "inhibit officials in the discharge of
their duties" and qualified immunity "accommodate[s] these conflicting concerns").
Police departments are unique para-military organizations and their employees neces-
sarily confront and legitimately employ violence with split-second judgment. See
THOMAS J. DEAKIN, POLICE PROFESSIONALISM: THE RENAISSANCE OF AMERICAN
LAw ENFORCEMENT 214 (1988); DOUGLAS PEREZ, COMMON SENSE ABOUT POLICE
REVIEW 43-44 (1994). In this atmosphere, even some well-grounded complaints will
be lodged against most police departments. The Supreme Court has cautioned that
some misconduct by employees will not tarnish the municipal employer serving an
important public function by providing law enforcement. See Pembaur v. Cincinnati,
475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986) (finding that a single incident by a decisionmaker with final
authority constitutes a policy); Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 814 (1985) (plu-
rality opinion) (single incident is not sufficient to impose municipal liability); see also
Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1392-93, (questioning but not deciding whether proof of a "single
incident" is ever sufficient to establish municipal liability where the constitutional tort
is not based upon direct municipal action by a policy maker). A plaintiff asserting
municipal liability by alleging a policy or custom based upon the mere numerosity of
past complaints without more will likely fail.
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application of the deliberate indifference standard to claims that a
citizen complaint procedure is inadequate and summarizes litiga-
tion in several small and large communities employing the various
models for complaint review. Additionally, Part IV examines the
issues of proof raised in Canton and reinforced in Brown. The Ar-
ticle divides the cases by the models employed; however, the po-
tential deficiencies in any model and the issues of proof suggested
by the Court in Brown find substantial commonality regardless of
the model a municipality adopts. Part V summarizes some of the
judicially-dictated minimum standards by which towns and cities
should assess their own complaint review procedure.
II. Municipal Police Forces Move Toward Professionalism
The modern police force is vastly different than its counterpart
of just twenty years ago.16 Recruits in major municipalities typi-
cally undergo substantial assessment and training prior to serving
on a police force. This screening and training includes psychologi-
cal screening prior to selection to ensure suitability and stability,
17
complete full-time basic training in police science,18 and general
education requirements. 19 Experienced officers undertake special-
16. See DEAKIN, supra note 15, at 255-300.
17. See THEODORE BLAU, PSYCHOLOGICAL SERVICES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT
69-162 (1994). The typical major police department employs psychologists to evaluate
both recruits and officers. Psychologists screen and assess recruits, determine fitness
for duty, and assess suitability for special unit assignment. See id.; Thomas H. Wright,
Pre-Employment Background Investigations, 60 FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL. 16
(1991) (discussing the evolution to a more complex pre-employment background
check including polygraph, education, previous employers, spousal interviews, credit
checks, criminal history checks, military history, and driving records among others).
18. While the training time and subjects vary, municipal and state governments
invest considerable resources in initial training. "[A] number of states have imple-
mented mandatory state-wide selection standards while others have not; some states
mandate an [sic] minimum of three weeks of recruit basic training, while others man-
date a 16-week recruit basic training period .... " Albert A. Apa & Thomas J.
Jurkanin, Police Officer Standards & Training Commissions: Three Decades of
Growth, 57 THE POLICE CHIEF 27, 30 (1990); DEAKIN, supra note 15, at 272.
19. Today, 65% of police officers have some college credit and 25% are college
graduates. See Larry Armstrong & Clinton Longenecker, Police Management Train-
ing: A National Survey, 61 FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL. 22, 22, 26 n.2 (1992);
David L. Carter & Allen D. Sapp, College Education and Policing: Coming of Age, 61
FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL. 8 (1992). In comparison, in 1970, only 14.6 % of
American police officers had completed two years of college; by 1994, approximately
44.7% have two or more years of college. Increased education appears to correlate
with decreased complaint rates and 95% of police departments now require at least a
high school diploma. See Alan Vodicka, Educational Requirements for Police Re-
cruits, 42 LAw & ORDER 91, 93 (1994). See generally, DEAKIN, supra note 15, at 272,
283 (stating that in the past 30 years, "a 23% advance in the collegiate educational
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ized and/or refresher training periodically,2" receive substantial
training for supervisory positions 2 and perform under chain of
command and supervision models which attempt to ensure order
within departments.22 Furthermore, many major municipal police
academies are accredited by the Commission on Accreditation for
Law Enforcement Agencies ("CALEA")23 and must meet mini-
mum national standards in multiple areas of law enforcement.2 4
Studies suggest that higher educational levels among police officers
result in lower numbers of citizen complaints. 25 Large municipal
police departments continuously employ innovative new policing
programs in an effort to improve their community responsiveness
and community relations while reducing both complaints against
officers and crime against citizens. Community policing and diver-
sity training programs are recent examples of efforts by modern
police departments to respond to citizen concerns.26
level of America's police" and less than 1% of officers have not completed high
school).
20. See Apa & Jurkanin, supra note 18, at 28; IACP Addresses Police Brutality
Concerns: "Project Response" Underway, 58 THE POLICE CHIEF 10 (1991) (describ-
ing the "Training Keys" series, a model in-service training program in use for over 25
years throughout most police departments); DEAKIN, supra note 15, at 197-208, 271-
83 (tracing trends in training throughout nation).
21. See Deakin, supra note 15, at 271-84; Armstrong & Longenecker, supra note
19, at 23-27. Armstrong and Longnecker reported that:
[t]he results indicated that 97% of the police agencies surveyed [144 police
departments including the two largest in each state] provide in-house super-
visory training to newly promoted officers and that 78% of these agencies
make the training mandatory .... Eighty three percent of the department
require 25 hours, 37% require at least 40 hours, and 23% require over 65
hours [for officers promoted to first line supervisor] .... [S]urvey results
showed that 81% of the departments provide an opportunity for managerial
training.
Armstrong & Longnecker, supra note 19, at 23-27.
22. Cf BLAU, supra note 17, at 36.
23. See Deakin, supra note 15, at 313-15 (describing movement toward accredita-
tion); Raymond E. Arthurs, Jr., Accreditation: A Small Department's Experience, 59
FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL. 1, 1, 5 n.1 (1990). CALEA brought together four
influential police organizations: International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP),
National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives (NOBLE), the Na-
tional Sheriffs' Association (NSA), and the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF)
to formulate standards for administration, operations, and organization among others.
See id. Over 300 law enforcement agencies have been accredited. See BLAU, supra
note 17, at 2.
24. See Apa & Jurkanin, supra note 18, at 28. Nearly every state has established
commissions empowered to set mandatory minimum requirements of Police Officer
Standards and Training (POST commissions). See id.
25. See Vodicka, supra note 19, at 92.
26. See, e.g., John E. Eck, Alternative Futures for Policing, in POLICE INNOVATION
AND CONTROL OF THE POLICE 59-80 (David Weisburd & Craig Uchida, eds., 1993)
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When modern police forces train officers to set standards of
27 2competency, screen recruits for suitability,28 provide additional
training for supervisors, 29 develop innovative new police operation
programs,30 and effectively employ either an internal or external
review of citizen complaints,31 local taxpayers should not be liable
for the misdeeds of its police officers under MonelP2 or Canton
33
theories of liability. A municipality is not liable for the misconduct
of its employees under section 1983 based upon respondeat supe-
rior tort principles, and, without evidence that it failed its munici-
pal duties, mere misconduct by its employees will not be sufficient
to establish municipal liability. 34 Failure to develop an effective
[hereinafter POLICE INNOVATION); see also DENNIS ROSENBAUM, THE CHALLENGE
OF COMMUNITY POLICING (1994) (evaluating effectiveness of new community policing
programs); Stephen M. Hennessey, Achieving Cultural Competence, 60 THE POLICE
CHIEF 46 (1993) (discussing recruit training in cultural diversity); Debra Livingston,
Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and
the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 565-591 (1997); R. Morrison, Problem-
Oriented Policing, 41 LAW & ORDER 84 (1993) (discussing proactive policing tech-
niques); Max Raterman, Police Supervision at a Crossroads, 42 LAW & ORDER 79
(1994) (discusssing modern management styles); David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can
the Violence Be Contained?, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 465, 496 (1992) (community
policing model built on premise of "mutual respect" and hope is that it will curb
abuse).
27. See Signorile v. City of New York, 887 F. Supp. 403, 422-23 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)
(stating in a summary judgment in favor of municipality: "sworn affidavit of a NYPD
deputy commissioner of training describing the training police .officers receive. More-
over, the affidavit indicates that training is supplemented and updated 'on a continual
basis'); Fulwood v. Porter, 639 A.2d 594, 600 (D.C. App. 1994) ("officers trained
adequately and receive refresher courses ... are instructed, on a continuing basis ...
approximately 24 weeks of training received by new officers... refresher training ...
consigis of 120 hours of instruction and is offered a minimum of 12 times a year").
28. See Longin v. Kelly, 875 F. Supp. 196, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding no liability
for deliberate indifference in hiring officers with violent propensity when a psycholo-
gist screened recruits and certain scored individuals receive heightened scrutiny
before recommendations for acceptance as officers were made).
29. Cf Bordanaro v. McLeod, 871 F.2d 1151, 1161 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding munici-
pal liability where officers were affirmatively discouraged from seeking further
training).
30. See Signorile, 887 F. Supp. at 423 (finding no municipal liability where police
and Housing Authority met to plan better coordination and identify areas where
training could be improved).
31. Cf Bordanaro, 871 F.2d at 1162 (criticizing a municipality which "chose to
take no disciplinary actions against officers until they had been indicted").
32. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
33. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
34. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 663-64 n.7. The Court stated: "the doctrine of respon-
deat superior is not a basis for rendering municipalities liable under § 1983 for the
constitutional torts of their employees." Id. Despite language favorable to munici-
palities, Monell actually marked an expansion of municipal liability, overruling
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), which had insulated municipalities from civil
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program to handle citizen grievances of police misconduct is, how-
ever, a municipal deficiency. Developing a grievance procedure
which satisfies Canton3 5 has proven a difficult challenge to both
small and large communities.
HI. Complaint Review Procedures
In the wake of shocking police scandals, high profile ad hoc com-
missions are sometimes convened in major cities to review police
misconduct.3 6 While these commissions often result in calls for ma-
jor reform and focus attention on problems of misconduct, these
after-the-fact inquiries do not satisfy a department's on-going re-
sponsibility to receive and address citizen complaints of police mis-
conduct on a regular basis.37 The typical metropolitan police force
no longer awaits the results of ad hoc investigations of misconduct
to reveal problem officers. Instead, it has procedures to receive
and investigate citizen complaints and to discipline misbehaving of-
ficers to the extent permissible under union contracts and public
employment law. 8
rights liability by concluding municipal corporations were not persons within the
meaning of the Civil Rights Act. See generally Michael Gerhardt, The Monell Legacy:
Balancing Federalism Concerns and Municipal Accountability Under Section 1983, 62
S. CAL. L. REV. 539 (1989) (tracing Supreme Court decisions following the line of
Monell); Douglas Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants: Undermining Mo-
nell in Police Brutality Cases, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 518-21 (1993) (discussing legisla-
tive history of Civil Rights Act, Monroe and Monell decisions).
35. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
36. These well-publicized 'blue ribbon' commissions typically form in response to
a particular scandal and make recommendations for change; some became permanent
bodies. See John Dombrink, The Touchables: Vice and Police Corruption in the 1980s,
in POLICE DEVIANCE 61-98 (Thomas Barker & David L. Carter, eds., 1991) [hereinaf-
ter DEVIANCE]; PEREZ, supra note 15, at 19-34; Samuel Walker, Historical Roots of
the Legal Control of Police Behavior, in POLICE INNOVATION, supra note 26, at 32-52;
DEAKIN, supra note 15, at 105-08.
37. See Rudovsky, supra note 26, at 497 (recommending that review of citizen
complaints is a necessary component of accountability).
38. There is little acknowledgment in case law for the conflict between the need to
discipline and the need to afford officers employment rights and protections. See
Click v. Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 609 F. Supp. 1199, 1205 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (holding
that police officer has right to notice and opportunity to be heard before suspension
without pay); see also Werner E. Petterson, Police Accountability and Civilian Over-
sight of Policing: An American Perspective, in COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE POLICE:
THE TREND TO EXTERNAL REVIEW 259, 270 (Andrew J. Goldsmith ed., 1991) [here-
inafter COMPLAINTS]; Jan TenBruggencate, Police Rehire Officer Fired In Exotic
Dancer Case, THE HONOLULU ADVERTISER, April 8, 1997, at B-1 (labor arbitrator
orders police officer who was dismissed for tampering with evidence and sexual mis-
conduct with arrestee to be rehired); Richard J. Terrill, Civilian Oversight of the Police
Complaints Process in the United States: Concerns, Developments, and More Con-
cerns, in COMPLAINTS 291; Mitchell Tyre & Susan Braunstein, Building Better Civilian
216
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The systematic collection, review, and disposition of citizen com-
plaints against police officers follows many models.39 The simplest
model, still employed in small towns, involves informal investiga-
tion and discipline of officers by supervisory officers.4 0 Large and
mid-size police departments ordinarily employ "internal affairs"
units' to investigate complaints of misconduct independently. n
Review Boards, 63 FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL. 10, 14 n.3 (1994), citing Judith
Secher, Legal Considerations Involving Civilian Review of Police Conduct, THE PO-
LICE CHIEF 11 (March 1993) ("Framers [of civilian review boards] need to consider
potential legal conflicts with applicable police officer bills of rights and collective bar-
gaining agreements. In addition, jeopardy to criminal cases might arise through
granting immunity for subpoenaed testimony."); Paul West, Investigation and Review
of Complaints Against Police Officers: An Overview of Issues and Philosophies, in
DEVIANCE, supra note 36, at 373-99.
39. D. Carter, Police Disciplinary Procedures: A Review of Selected Police Depart-
ments, in DEVIANCE, supra note 36, at 351 (descriptive survey of 20 major United
States police departments); PEREZ, supra note 15, at 230-49 (comparative evaluation
of internal, civilian, and hybrid forms of police review systems); Richard Jones,
Processing Civilian Complaints: A Study of the Milwaukee Fire and Police Commis-
sion, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 505, 508-509 (1994) (citing Samuel Walker & Vic Bumphus,
Civilian Review of The Police: A National Survey of the Fifty Largest Cities (1991);
West, supra note 38, at 373-99 (describing external and internal complaint review
models). Large cities typically utilize both internal review and civilian, independent
complaint review. See Lee P. Brown, The Civilian Review Board: Setting a Goal for
Future Obsolescence, 58 THE POLICE CHIEF 6 (1991) (sixty per cent of fifty largest
cities have civilian review in addition to internal complaint review).
Utilizing both internal and external review may be beneficial. On one hand, inter-
nal affairs systems may be more effective:
Numerous studies support the conclusion that civilian review boards are less
likely to sustain charges against police officers than chiefs acting on the re-
sults of police internal affairs investigations and that, furthermore, civilian
boards are more lenient in disciplinary recommendations when officers are
found guilty.
Tyre & Braunstein, supra note 38, at 10, 14 n.3. Thus, a purely civilian review system
without internal review may not achieve desired results. On the other hand, civilian
review fulfills two valuable functions, first, it provides an independent receptacle for
complaints and second, provides for public participation and confidence in system.
See Sa'id Wekili & Hyacinth E. Leus, Police Brutality: Problems of Excessive Force
Litigation, 25 PAC. L.J. 171, 192-96 (1993) (stating that the purpose of civilian review
is to conduct independent investigations and restore public confidence). However,
there is skepticism that multiple complaint procedures are necessary or effective. See
id.; see also Edward J. Littlejohn, The Civilian Police Commission: A Deterrent of
Police Misconduct, 59 U. DET. J. URB. L. 5, 10 (1981); Rudovsky, supra note 26, at 497
("civilian review is a necessary component of a system of accountability").
40. See PEREZ, supra note 15, at 87.
41. Id. at 88. "This model represents the overwhelming majority of review system
types; 83.9 percent of all police review systems are exclusively internal, completely
police-operated systems." Id. at 82 (citation omitted). Typically, internal affairs units
address both internally and externally generated complaints. See id. at 91.
Internal Affairs units are not uniformly structured. One model operates wholly
independently, one shares an investigatory role with the officer's supervisory officers,
and one allocates primary investigatory responsibility with supervisors and oversight
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Larger municipalities have moved toward external review by citi-
zen boards.42 Usually, these boards do not replace internal investi-
gation of misconduct. The citizen boards do, however, provide an
independent receptacle for, and an independent review of, com-
plaints.43 Several cities employ an integrated, hybrid system with
both civilian and police roles in receiving and disposing of citizen
complaints. 4
Each model of citizen complaint review has potential advantages
and disadvantages;4 5 no system is ideal.46 Informal systems vest in-
ordinate discretion in supervisory personnel, and their success de-
and review to the internal affairs. See West, supra note 38, at 395, citing H. Beral &
M. Sisk, The Administration of Complaints by Civilians Against the Police, 77 HARV.
L. REV. 499 (1964).
42. See generally COMPLAINTS, supra note 38; PEREZ, supra note 15, at 88; Brown,
supra note 39.
43. See PEREZ, supra note 15, at 82-83; Petterson, supra note 38, at 279.
44. See PEREZ, supra note 15, at 164-95. Perez believes that a hybrid system,
which has roles for both civilian and police in the complaint review process, combines
the best of internal investigation with the best of civilian review. See id.
Other studies describe external review as following one of three models: civilian
review, civilian input, and civilian monitor. Citizen involvement is greatest in the ci-
vilian review model (civilians investigate, adjudicate, and recommend punishment to
chief); less so in civilian input (receive and investigate); and least involvement in the
civilian monitor system (internal process with civilian review of procedure for fairness
and adequacy). See West, supra note 38 at 395.
45. Douglas Perez conducted a comparative study of police review systems over
seventeen years. Three kinds of systems, internal, external, and hybrid were identi-
fied. He tested each for 1) the integrity (thorough, fair, objective) of the system; 2)
the legitimacy (public confidence) in the system; and 3) the learning (impact on future
conduct) occurring as a result of the system. See PEREZ, supra note 15, at 72-81.
Perez concludes that complaints should be received through multiple receptacles, lo-
cated both within the department and outside the department. He also prefers a hy-
brid investigatory system with either internal investigation coupled with a civilian
monitor role or a shared investigation system where non-police question complain-
ants. Perez concludes that not all complaints merit hearings, but when hearings are
necessary, a multidisciplinary hearing board is preferred. See id. at 250-66. He also
concludes that the final decision to discipline be retained by the police executive, as is
typical. See id. at 239, 268; see also Goldsmith, External Review and Self Regulation,
in COMPLAINTS, at 33-38 (identifying drawbacks of civilian review: police resistence to
a civilian role, procedural deficiencies, nonprofessional investigations); Jones, supra
note 39, at 517 (explaining that Milwaukee uniquely vests disciplinary authority in
Commission); Bill Ong Hing, Border Patrol Abuse: Evaluating Complaint Procedures
Available to Victims, 9 GEO. IMMIOR. L.J. 757, 798 (1995) (describing and evaluating
INS's newest complaint procedures by an independent office within the Department
of Justice; noting labor opposition to review); West, supra note 38, at 395.
46. See West, supra note 38, at 399 ("There is obviously not 'one best model' that
can be placed within a police organization. Rather, factors such as community atti-
tude and support for the police, the presence of police malpractice problems, allega-
tions of police department cover-ups, and the sociopolitical environment of the
community must all be considered in a complaint review program.")
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pends upon the integrity and effectiveness of supervisors and the
chief of police. An informal system also lacks accountability and
oversight.47 While an informal system may function well under an
effective leader, it just as easily permits cover up and neglect to
flourish under an ineffective leader.
Internal affairs systems provide safeguards absent in an informal
system. In the internal affairs model, formalized policies and pro-
cedures are promulgated to guide the initiation and conduct of in-
vestigations. Additionally, professional investigators, following
standard investigatory procedures, staff the internal affairs unit.
Thus, complaints against officers, in theory, are investigated with
the same diligence as the department's other criminal investiga-
tions. Furthermore, the devotion of full-time manpower to an in-
ternal affairs unit demonstrates a municipality's sincere
commitment to uncovering abuse, unlike an informal system where
such investigations are merely an incidental supervisory task. Most
notably, as compared to civilian review, the internal affairs system
appears to have a superior record of sustaining complaints and rec-
ommending discipline. 41 Police investigators apparently hold of-
ficers accountable for their conduct more often than civilians
investigating and judging misconduct. Advantages of an internal
affairs systems include efficiency, as well as the professionalism of
investigators and their ability to understand law enforcement is-
sues.4 9 Finally, the location of an internal affairs unit within the
department helps to ensure communication between the investiga-
tory unit and those making personnel decisions. Disadvantages of
internal affairs systems include, most significantly, profound public
distrust and the potential for biased, self-serving and superficial in-
vestigations." Public distrust manifests itself as public fear or re-
luctance to report misconduct to the police or a lack of confidence
in the results. Failure to report abuse or a systematic disregard of
reported complaints undermines the effectiveness of the whole
47. See PEREZ, supra note 15, at 104 (informal systems permit cover-ups, regard-
less of whether abuses occur or not, and discourage complainants from filing
complaints).
48. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
49. See PEREZ, supra note 15, at 104 ("primary strength of the internalized review
process is the competence and professionalism of its investigators").
50. See Goldsmith, supra note 38, at 24-28.
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complaint system.51 In addition, the public's distrust undermines
its belief in the legitimacy of the police. 2
Civilian review boards cure the real or perceived bias and intimi-
dation problems inherent in internal civilian complaint models.53
Advantages of citizen review boards include increased public ac-
cess because the process appears less threatening,54 a public per-
ception of the independence of the investigatory process, and an
increased public confidence in the evaluative process.5 5 Civilian re-
view is typically, though not always, more open to public scrutiny.56
A citizen review system, however, also has disadvantages. 7 Chief
among those disadvantages is the apparent tendency of civilians to
judge police officers less harshly, to recommend lighter discipline,
and the lack of professionalism of civilian investigators. 58 Most
51. See Goldsmith, supra note 38, at 21-24.
52. See generally PEREZ, supra note 15, at 102-22; Sean Hecker, Race and Pretex-
tual Traffic Stops: An Expanded Role for Civilian Review Board, 28 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 551, 603 (1997); Rudovsky, supra note 26, at 497. Ironically, internal
affairs departments noted for their rigor and unrestricted investigatory powers lead
police officers to view some internal systems as tyrannical and unfair. See generally
PEREZ, supra note 15, at 102-22; Sean Hecker, Race and Pretextual Traffic Stops: An
Expanded Role for Civilian Review Board, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 551, 603
(1997); Rudovsky, supra note 26, at 497.
53. See Livingston, supra note 26, at 665-66.
54. The United States Civil Rights Commission recommends external locations to
file complaints, and surveys of complainants indicate the same. See PEREZ, supra
note 15, at 102-03; Petterson, supra note 38, at 277 (commenting that fear of retalia-
tion discourages complaints).
55. PEREZ, supra note 15, at 148-49 (revealing that complainants surveyed "are
impressed with the civilian system; they are comfortable talking to civilians about
their grievances; and they have more faith in civilian investigators"); Livingston, supra
note 26, at 663-65 (civilian review increases integrity of process and public
confidence).
56. See PEREZ, supra note 15, at 132.
57. The efficacy of civilian review is not yet known. However, public confidence is
a laudable goal in and of itself.
The actual effectiveness of civilian review in ... law enforcement is unclear.
Some studies show that determinations made by civilians do not differ sub-
stantially from those made by the police department; others show that civil-
ian review procedures sustain citizen complaints at rates not significantly
higher than those reported by internal affairs units. But the vigor of investi-
gations seems to be greater in cities with civilian review, and citizens seem to
have more confidence in civilian versus strictly internal review systems.
Hing, supra note 45, at 798 (footnotes omitted).
58. See Tyre & Braunstein, supra note 38; see also PEREZ, supra note 15, at 139. In
1991, Berkeley, California's review board logged "the first instance of a higher rate of
findings of misconduct from the civilian review process tha[n] this study has found in
seventeen years of research. In other words, not at any time in the history of civilian
review had a civilian system found the police guilty more often than had an internal
system until Berkeley did so in 1991." PEREZ, supra note 15, at 139 (emphasis
omitted).
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problematic, these civilian boards may become weighed down by
their own procedures and operate so inefficiently as to fail in their
primary purpose. 59 Finally, the externality and independence of
the review board, a valued characteristic when receiving and inves-
tigating complaints, may result in an institutional failure at the res-
olution stage of the process. Unless there is a process by which the
status and disposition of complaints are reported to and considered
by internal departments making personnel decisions, the impact of
the process is diminished.6"
In sum, there is no clearly superior method to receive and re-
solve police misconduct complaints. Adopting any model poses
challenges and pitfalls to municipal policymakers. 61 While identify-
ing the advantages and disadvantages of each model (informal, in-
ternal, or civilian) is useful, a municipality is also well-served by
considering desirable goals for its complaint process.
A community's evaluation of its procedures for handling civilian
complaints should recognize that receiving and resolving citizen
complaints is integral to many law enforcement functions, and that
the complaint process must serve those multiple purposes.62 First,
the complaint process must deliver a fair and satisfactory result in
an individual case. Obviously, this justice requirement is equally
important to both the officer and the complainant. Second, receiv-
ing, investigating, and adjudicating complaints from citizens against
officers are key aspects of departmental supervision of its officers.
Often, the public has unique knowledge about the performance of
officers in the field away from supervisory officers. Thus, in addi-
tion to providing a procedure that is fair to both aggrieved citizens
and accused officers, receiving and adjudicating complaints is a
component of personnel management and supervision of errant of-
ficers. The process provides an important mechanism to identify
59. See Cox v. District of Columbia, 821 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1993), affd 40 F.3d
475 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see also PEREZ, supra note 15, at 134 (discussing the delays in
hearing and resolving complaints by civilian review board in Berkeley, California,
noting the "negative impact on the effectiveness"; often the police chief has meted out
punishment before the civilian process is concluded); Petterson, supra note 38, at 279-
280.
60. See infra notes 208, 214-222 and accompanying text.
61. See supra note 46.
62. See Paul Hoffman, The Feds, Lies, and Videotape: The Need For an Effective
Federal Role in Controlling Police Abuse in Urban America, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1453,
1481 (1993). The Christopher and Kolt reports, investigating abuses within the Los
Angeles Police Department, demonstrated that despite a system to review and receive
civilian complaints, the several dozen "bad" officers remained on the force and were
even promoted: "the system was stacked against civilian complainants suggest[ing]
department-wide indifference". Id.
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officers who should be disciplined, transferred, retrained, demoted,
or dismissed for misconduct. Third, the responsiveness of the de-
partment to citizen complaints gives civilians confidence that the
department polices itself and does not hold itself above the law.
This accountability function is important for the department in or-
der to achieve and preserve the public confidence and legitimacy
necessary to operate effectively as a police department. Finally,
the receipt of citizen complaints, contextually, serves the depart-
ment as an indicator of larger problems, such as problem officers,
problem areas of training, and problem geographic areas with defi-
cient supervisors. To that extent, complaints may reveal an organi-
zational need for restructuring, reassessing, and changing.
Civil rights decisions against municipalities generally reflect a ju-
dicial expectation that civilian complaint procedures serve these
important goals.63 While courts have not weighed in on which
model best achieves the important functions of a complaint review
procedure, courts have articulated certain expectations regarding
complaint procedures. Most importantly, decisions indicate that
courts have embraced the basic premise that adequate complaint
review is vital to a police department's supervisory responsibilities.
IV. Failure to Investigate Civilian Complaints of Police
Misconduct as a Basis for Municipal Liability
A. Deliberate Indifference Claims
In City of Canton v. Harris,64 the United States Supreme Court
decided, in a failure-to-train case, that municipal liability could
arise for a constitutional tort by an employee when an omission,
such as the failure-to-properly-train an employee, amounted to de-
liberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police
come in contact.65 In Canton, plaintiff alleged that following her
arrest, officers offered her no medical assistance despite severe
emotional ailments that later required hospitalization and outpa-
tient treatment.66 She alleged that the City of Canton was culpable
because it vested the discretion to determine the medical needs of
detainees in the hands of supervisors who did not receive adequate
training to assess those medical needs.67 The Court was asked to
determine both whether an otherwise constitutional policy (the
63. See generally infra Parts IV & V.
64. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
65. See id. at 390-92.
66. See id. at 381.
67. See id. at 381-82.
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city's policy of providing medical care for detainees) 6 8 could give
rise to liability where the training to implement that policy was in-
adequate, and by what standard such inadequacy should be
judged.69
The Canton Court established that, in addition to liability for af-
firmative customs or policies under Monell, municipalities demon-
strating deliberate indifference to training police officers could also
be liable to citizens for constitutional deprivations caused by an
otherwise constitutional policy.70 The Court acknowledged that
the City of Canton's policy that every jailor, with permission of the
supervisor, could secure medical treatment for detainees, was un-
deniably a constitutional policy.71 Yet, the plaintiff claimed that if
that policy was unconstitutionally applied by a municipal em-
ployee, the city could be liable.72 The Court agreed. In explaining
the contours of this liability, however, the Court cautioned that
"adequately trained officers occasionally make mistakes" and that
no municipal liability would be imposed for such occasional mis-
takes.73 In fact, the Court noted that such mistakes "say little
about the training program or the legal basis for holding the city
liable. '7 a Therefore, the Court next asked, by what standard
should municipal liability be judged to ensure that courts did not
impose mere respondeat superior liability.75
The first inquiry under Canton requires the court to examine the
"adequacy of the training program in relation to the tasks the par-
ticular officers must perform." 76 The municipality must train its of-
ficers to "respond properly to the usual and recurring situations
68. See id. at 387; see also Cox v. District of Columbia, 821 F. Supp. 1, 12 (D.C.
1993) ("[i]n addition to concluding that a policy of failing to take action could amount
to a policy or custom, City of Canton v. Harris held for the first time that constitu-
tional policies as well as unconstitutional policies could result in municipal liabil-
ity... ."), affid, 40 F.3d 475 (1994).
69. Canton, 489 U.S. at 385.
70. See Michael T. Burke & Patricia A. Burton, Defining the Contours of Munici-
pal Liability Under 42 U.S. C. § 1983: Monell Through City of Canton v. Harris, 18
STETSON L. REv. 511 (1989) (explaining that municipal liability is fault-based);
Anthony D. Schroeder, Note, City of Canton v. Harris: The Deliberate Indifference
Standard in 42 U.S. C. § 1983 Municipal Liability Failure to Train Cases, 22 U. TOL. L.
REv. 107, 111 n.31 (1990).
71. See Canton, 489 U.S. at 386.
72. See id. at 387.
73. Id. at 391.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 391-92.
76. Id. at 390.
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with which they must deal."77 The Court made clear that munici-
palities would not be liable for failing to anticipate extraordinary
events requiring special training. The Court also expressed toler-
ance for some failures in police training: "[t]hat a particular officer
may be unsatisfactorily trained will not alone suffice to fasten lia-
bility on the city, for the officer's shortcomings may have resulted
from factors other than a faulty training program. '78 In summing
up the claimant's burden to prove the inadequacy, the Court ex-
plained that a municipality would be liable only where the inade-
quacy was "likely to result in the violation of constitutional
rights. ' '7 9
Second, the claimant must demonstrate the municipality's culpa-
ble deliberateness. Determining deliberate indifference demands
exploring policymakers' deliberative, decision-making process8°
when developing training programs. The Court explained that
policymakers demonstrate "deliberate indifference," a standard
which the Court characterized as higher than either negligence or
gross negligence, to the civil rights of claimants when they make a
"'conscious" or "deliberate choice to follow a course of action...
from among various alternatives."'81 As to the deliberative process,
the Court framed the inquiry as whether:
[I]n light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees
the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the
inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional
rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said
to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.82
The Court also required proof that the municipality's inadequate
training actually caused the injury.13 The Court explained that "the
identified deficiency in a city's training program must be closely
related to the ultimate injury. '84 Canton calls upon the jury to an-
77. Id. at 391.
78. Id. at 390.
79. Id. at 390.
80. See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 129 (1988) (holding that pol-
icy must be furthered by those with final policymaking authority); see also Schroeder,
supra note 70, at 127.
81. Canton, 489 U.S. at 389 (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-84
(1986) (plurality) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
82. Id. at 390.
83. See id. at 391.
84. Id.; accord Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding
that plaintiff must prove policymaker "knows to a moral certainty" that officers will
confront such a situation and that lack of training will frequently lead officers to make
the wrong choice); see also Schroeder, supra note 70, at 128.
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swer the question, "[w]ould the injury have been avoided... [if]
the program ... was not deficient in the identified respect."85 This
close causal relationship necessitates proof that adequately trained
officers would have responded differently to the situation.
Canton, therefore, requires a precisely drawn accusation of the
deliberate indifference of a municipality.86 It is not enough under
Canton that the department's training program is inadequate. The
plaintiff must demonstrate that the inadequacy actually caused a
constitutional violation, that the inadequacy was the result of a de-
liberate choice by a policymaker, and that the likelihood the choice
would lead to injury was obvious in light of the usual and recurring
tasks to which an officer is assigned.8 7 The narrowly-crafted allega-
tion requirement generally assures municipalities that police forces
with recruitment, training, and supervision practices reflecting pol-
icy choices consistent with national standards should be fairly insu-
lated from claims except for very specific weaknesses.
88
Lower courts instantly extended Canton beyond failure-to-train
claims to claims based upon a municipality's inadequate system of
hiring, supervising, or reviewing police misconduct.8 9 When chal-
lenging the adequacy of citizen complaint procedures, plaintiffs
typically allege that the failure to institute an adequate system to
receive, investigate, and resolve citizen complaints against police
85. Canton, 489 U.S. at 391.
86. See id. at 388-89.
87. See, e.g., Kerr v. City of West Palm Beach, 875 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1989)
(city's failure to require continual and rigorous canine unit training caused injury to
suspects apprehended by canines); Parker v. District of Columbia, 850 F.2d 708 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (deficient extra-jurisdictional arrest procedure training and physical fitness
training), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989).
88. See Bordanaro v. McLeod, 871 F.2d 1151, 1162-63 (1st Cir.) ("The absence of a
strictly enforced disciplinary system led the officers ... to believe they were above
the law and would not be sanctioned for their misconduct. A sufficiently supervised,
properly recruited, trained and disciplined group of officers would not have acted so
far below the level of accepted police behavior."), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 820 (1989); cf.
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378-80 (1975) (denying injunctive relief; federal courts
are ill suited to second guess municipalities implementing police programs).
89. Canton implied that the deliberate indifference standard presumably applies to
failure to act cases besides failure-to-train where inaction is a moving force behind
constitutional injury. Canton, 489 U.S. at 394-95 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("[W]here, as here, a claim of municipal liability is predicated upon a failure to act,
the requisite degree of fault must be shown by proof of a background of events and
circumstances which establish that the 'policy of inaction' is the functional equivalent
of a decision by the city itself to violate the Constitution."). Brown confirmed the
potential by considering deliberate indifference in the context of improper hiring. See
Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1390; see also Shari S. Weinman, Comment, Supervisory Liability
Under 42 U.S. C. Section 1983: Searching For The Deep Pocket, 56 Mo. L. REV. 1041
(1991).
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officers amounts to a policy of deliberate indifference to the need
for police supervision. Plaintiffs further assert that the failure to
investigate claims of misconduct or to discipline wrongdoers as-
sures that similar misconduct will recur within a climate of lawless-
ness engendered by non-supervision. 90 Fitting the claim into
Canton's test, one court has stated:
[A] city's complete failure to maintain an adequate system of
disciplining officers who act unconstitutionally might also "fairly
be said to represent a policy for which the city is responsible,
and for which the city may be held liable if it actually causes
injury."91
Just as Canton requires the fact finder ultimately to ask whether
a properly trained officer would have acted differently, these cases
ask whether a more effective system to address citizen complaints
would have prevented the officer from inflicting a constitutional
injury upon the plaintiff. The necessary premise at the core of this
claim is whether effective citizen complaint review would have led
to better performance by the errant police officer. As the decided
cases demonstrate, some courts eagerly have embraced that core
premise:
[A]lthough [plaintiff] has not demonstrated that [deficiencies in
the complaint process] actually encouraged additional miscon-
duct or excessive force violations, the ... inadequacies certainly
did permit serious misconduct to go unchecked. In that sense,
the District's policy "caused" or was a "substantial factor" in
[plaintiff's] injuries. Logically, "continued official tolerance of
repeated misconduct facilitates similar unlawful actions in the
future."92
The need to ask that core question in a narrow and case specific
manner was reaffirmed in Board of County Commissioners of Bry-
90. See, e.g., Fiacco v. City of Rensselaer, 783 F.2d 319, 328 (2d Cir. 1986)
("[P]roof that other claims were met with indifference for their truth may be one way
of satisfying the plaintiff's burden [to prove deliberate indifference]."), cert. denied,
480 U.S. 922 (1987); Brown v. City of Margate, 842 F. Supp. 515, 516 (S.D. Fla. 1993)
("[Plaintiff] argued that Margate police officers would use force with relative impu-
nity, knowing that the City would not follow up on complaints and would not disci-
pline or penalize officers for their excessive or unwarranted actions, and that this
custom led to the incident in which [the plaintiff] was injured"), afJ'd, 56 F.3d 1390
(11th Cir. 1995); Sango v. City of New York, 1989 WL 86995 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (recog-
nizing "proof of a policy of deliberate indifference based upon inadequate investiga-
tion of citizen complaints against police officers" is basis for § 1983 municipal claim).
91. Cox, 821 F. Supp. at 12.
92. Cox, 821 F. Supp. at 19 (quoting Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 851 (3d
Cir. 1990) (internal citations omitted)).
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ant County v. Brown,93 decided in 1997. There, plaintiff Brown
complained that her excessive force injuries at the hands of Deputy
Sheriff Burns were a result of the county's failure to adequately
screen Burns prior to appointment as a deputy. Plaintiff pointed to
no general inadequacy in hiring officers. Rather, the apparent
breakdown was the result of a familial relationship between the
sheriff and the deputy. The primary issue for the Court involved
whether proof of a "single incident" (the failure to screen a new
hire's criminal record) by a policymaker (the Sheriff) was sufficient
to establish deliberate indifference. Nevertheless, the Court's gen-
eral comments about proving deliberate indifference claims are il-
luminating because they suggest that Canton has appropriate
application beyond failure-to-train:
We concluded in Canton that an "inadequate training" claim
could be the basis for § 1983 liability in "limited circumstances."
We spoke, however, of a deficient training "program," necessar-
ily intended to apply over time to multiple employees. Exist-
ence of a "program" makes proof of fault and causation at least
possible in an inadequate training case. If a program does not
prevent constitutional violations, municipal decisionmakers may
eventually be put on notice that a new program is called for.
Their continued adherence to an approach that they know or
should know has failed to prevent tortious conduct by employ-
ees may establish the conscious disregard for the consequence of
their action-the "deliberate indifference"-necessary to trigger
municipal liability.94
Thus, the Court agreed that deliberate indifference claims can
extend beyond failure-to-train, at least to other "programs" marred
by obvious deficiencies which cause constitutional injuries. How-
ever, the Court also acknowledged the difficulty of proving, outside
of the failure-to-train context, the ultimate question posed by Can-
ton: Would this officer have behaved differently if a proper pro-
gram were in place? The Court expressed skepticism as to whether
a plaintiff could prove that adequately screening applicants before
hiring could predict a particular officer's future behavior, especially
where the plaintiff proved only a single instance of neglectful
hiring:
The proffered analogy between failure-to-train cases and inade-
quate screening cases is not persuasive. In leaving open in Can-
ton the possibility that a plaintiff might succeed in carrying a
93. 117 S. Ct. 1382 (1997).
94. Id. at 1390.
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failure-to-train claim without showing a pattern of constitutional
violations, we simply hypothesized that, in a narrow range of
circumstances, a violation of federal rights may be a highly pre-
dictable consequence of a failure to equip law enforcement of-
ficers with specific tools to handle recurring situations.
Where a plaintiff presents a § 1983 claim premised upon the in-
adequacy.of an official's review of a prospective applicant's rec-
ord, however, there is a particular danger that a municipality
will be held liable for an injury not directly caused by a deliber-
ate action attributable to the municipality itself .... To prevent
municipal liability for a hiring decision from collapsing into re-
spondeat superior liability, a court must carefully test the link
between the policymaker's inadequate decision and the particu-
lar injury alleged."
Importantly, the Court pointed out that inadequate training more
predictably leads to injuries than does a hiring decision and that
the causal link is therefore easier to prove in a training case. The
decision alerts litigants that, outside of failure-to- train claims,
proving causation between a municipal program and a constitu-
tional injury may prove to be a steep hurdle.
Unlike the risk from a particular glaring omission in a training
regimen, the risk from a single instance of inadequate screening
of an applicant's background is not "obvious" in the abstract;
rather, it depends upon the background of the applicant. A lack
of scrutiny may increase the likelihood that an unfit officer will
be hired, and that the unfit officer will, when placed in a particu-
lar position to affect the rights of citizens, act improperly. But
that risk is only a generalized showing of risk.96
The difficulty of linking a failure to adequately screen recruits
with their future misconduct is not unlike the challenge before
plaintiffs alleging that inadequate complaint review leads to contin-
ued misconduct. As the Court pointed out:
[A] finding of culpability simply cannot depend on the mere
probability that any officer inadequately screened will inflict any
constitutional injury. Rather, it must depend on a finding that
this officer was highly likely to inflict the particular injury suf-
fered by the plaintiff. The connection between the background
of the particular applicant and the specific constitutional viola-
tion must be strong.97
95. Id. at 1391.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1392.
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Analogously, to establish a claim that the deficient citizen griev-
ance procedures resulted in injury, plaintiffs must prove that the
inadequate procedures made it highly likely that the officer would
inflict this constitutional harm upon the plaintiff.
Claimants rely upon one of three methods to prove that an of-
ficer would have behaved differently if a better system of citizen
complaint review was in place. First, a plaintiff may attempt to
prove that there is a "climate of lawlessness" within a police de-
partment and that misconduct by police officers generally goes un-
checked.98 Along with this method, a plaintiff must also prove that
the particular officer-tortfeasor misbehaved because of this atmos-
phere. 99 Following Brown, this method of proof may be dubious.100
A second method of proof is more direct. A plaintiff may attempt
to prove that the particular officer, with a propensity toward mis-
conduct as shown through prior incidents, misbehaved because that
officer believed from past experience that nothing would hap-
pen.'01 Finally, a plaintiff may attempt to prove that, had previous
complaints against the officer been addressed at an earlier oppor-
tunity or more thoroughly, the officer likely would have been dis-
missed or disciplined before this incident.10 2
Despite the rigorous requirements of proof, claims of deliberate
indifference are no longer readily decided on the pleadings. In
1993, the Supreme Court rejected a heightened pleading standard
for municipal claims in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics In-
telligence & Coordination Unit.'°3 Resolving a split among the fed-
eral circuits, the Court in Leatherman reaffirmed its commitment
to Monell causes of action by rejecting a heightened pleading stan-
dard for such claims. The Court, however, also signaled its expec-
tation that poorly articulated claims should be disposed of at
98. See infra notes 108-31 and accompanying text (discussing Fiacco v. Rennselaer,
783 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1986)).
99. See Fiacco, 783 F.2d at 327.
100. See infra notes 130 & 152 and accompanying text for a discussion of pre-
Brown analysis. As Brown explained, the court must "directly test the link between
Burns' actual background and the risk that, if hired, he would use excessive force."
Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1392. Thus, "testing the link" requires plaintiff to prove that the
municipality's indifference to complaints caused this officer to violate plaintiff's rights.
101. See infra notes 159-63 and accompanying text (discussing Parrish v. Luckie,
963 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1992)).
102. See infra notes 186-208 and accompanying text (discussing Cox v. District of
Columbia, 821 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1993), aft'd, 40 F.3d 475 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
103. 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
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summary judgment. 10 4 Following Leatherman, municipalities must
be prepared to defend their city programs, including complaint re-
view systems, at summary judgment or trial. Early dismissal of
these claims at the pleadings stage is now less likely.10 5
B. Judicial Evaluation of the Complaint Review Process
1. Informal Complaint Review
While there are many variations, informal civilian complaint sys-
tems are typified by supervisory discretion. For example, citizen
complaints initially may be received by the chief or town leader,
assigned for investigation to other officers, and then finally re-
ferred to the chief for action. 06 The manner in which complaints
are received, whether or not to conduct an investigation, the disci-
pline, the reporting, and the monitoring may all be discretionary
decisions by the police chief. Informal systems are as effective or
ineffective as the person in charge. These systems often lack proce-
dural safeguards for the accused and the accuser. They also fail to
assign oversight and accountability roles to administrators. Thus,
while an informal method of citizen complaint review may work
effectively when a town has a conscientious police chief, the town
has no institutional assurance that the system will work
effectively.10 7
The judicial message is unmistakeable with regard to informal
systems: the town entrusting unfettered discretion to its police
chief will be liable for its police chief's failings. Fiacco v. Rensse-
laer'0 8 was one of the first cases to hold that a failure to investigate
prior complaints may evidence deliberate indifference. The case
arose in the context of a relatively small town with informal com-
plaint procedures. There, Mary Fiacco alleged that police used ex-
cessive force and caused her constitutional injury when she was
104. See id. at 168-69 (acknowledging an inundation of lawsuits and suggesting that
summary judgment is the appropriate mechanism to "weed out unmeritorious claims
sooner rather than later.").
105. See Illiano v. Clay Township, 892 F. Supp. 117 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (denying Clay
Township's motion to dismiss); Curran v. City of Boston, 777 F. Supp. 116 (D. Mass.
1991) (denying Boston's motion to dismiss); Vasquez v. Reid, No. 90 C 1585, 1990 WL
207456 (N.D. Ill. Dec., 6, 1990) (denying Chicago's motion to dismiss); see also Eric
Kugler, A 1983 Hurdle: Filtering Meritless Civil Rights Litigation at the Pleading Stage,
15 REV. LITIG. 551, 552-58 (1996).
106. See PEREZ, supra note 15, at 87-88.
107. See id.
108. 783 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 922 (1987). The case fore-
shadowed Canton and is cited with approval in Canton for the deliberate indifference
standard. See Canton, 489 U.S. at 397.
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arrested for disorderly conduct following a night of heavy drink-
ing. 10 9 After passing out on the lawn of a Rensselaer, New York
home she arrested and was brought to the police station." 0 While
exiting the patrol vehicle, she claimed she was "shoved," "drag-
ged," "kicked," and "poked" without provocation or justification
by Officers Meyer and Harrington."' The plaintiff offered evi-
dence that the Chief of Police had ignored prior instances of al-
leged brutality brought to his attention by civilians. Fiacco
advanced the theory that the failure to exercise reasonable care in
investigating prior complaints demonstrated deliberate indifference
to police brutality and the municipality's responsibility to supervise
its officers." 2 She argued that this deliberate indifference allowed
officers to injure plaintiff.113 The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed a jury verdict in favor of Fiacco against Rensse-
laer.1 14 The court approved Fiacco's theory of how municipal indif-
ference to complaints demonstrated failure to supervise and
resulted in her injury:
Fiacco's theory is not that the City intended to engage in unin-
tentional conduct. Rather it is that the City was knowingly and
deliberately indifferent to the possibility that its police officers
were wont to use excessive force and that this indifference was
demonstrated by the failure of the City defendants to exercise
reasonable care in investigating claims of police brutality in or-
der to supervise the officers in the proper use of force. We see
no logical flaw in such a hypothesis .... "I
The court was satisfied that this failure to supervise resulted in un-
checked abuse and made Fiacco's injuries likely."
Fiacco also addressed the admissibility of unsustained and un-
proven complaints as evidence of inadequate supervision. In re-
viewing the proceedings below, the Second Circuit agreed with the
109. See Fiacco, 783 F.2d at 321.
110. See id.
111. Id.
112. See id. at 323.
113. See id.
114. Compare id. with Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069, 1075 (8th Cir. 1996)
(describing situation in which mayor and city council members took immediate action
upon learning of misconduct), and Sharrar v. Felsing, No. Civ. A. 94-1878,1996 WL
117162, * 18 (D. N.J. March 7, 1996) (holding on summary judgment, town with only
twenty police officers not liable for failure to have an internal affairs department or
other formal complaint mechanisms in place), and York v. City of San Pablo, 626 F.
Supp. 34 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (finding no municipal liability in case of six complaints of
excessive force insufficient where complaints were all investigated by the city).
115. Fiacco, 783 F.2d at 326.
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trial judge that the probative value of unproven third party com-
plaints of misconduct outweighed their prejudicial value. 1 6 As the
court explained, evidence that past complaints had not been inves-
tigated proved Fiacco's theory of deliberate indifference. 117 "[I]f
the City's efforts to evaluate the claims were so superficial as to
suggest that its official attitude was one of indifference to the truth
of the claim, such an attitude would bespeak an indifference to the
rights asserted in those claims. "118 By alleging that a failure to in-
vestigate past complaints amounted to deliberate indifference
rather than a pattern of widespread abuse, the plaintiff overcame a
substantial obstacle. To prove a pattern of abuse, unfounded com-
plaints are not relevant. 119 However, to prove a climate of lawless-
ness due to a lack of supervision, the response to any complaint is
relevant.120
Having determined that unproven claims were admissible, the
court then examined the town's response to complaints and the
sufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence. 12  Although Rensselaer's
town charter called for a Public Safety Board to supervise the po-
116. See id. at 327-28.
117. See id. at 328 ("[wjhether or not the claims had validity, the very assertion of a
number of such claims put the City on notice. . ."); see also Beck, 89 F.3d at 975
(holding that evidence of unproven complaints is admissible when allegation is that
the grievance process is inadequate).
118. Fiacco, 783 F. 2d at 328.
119. The mere number of complaints (whether sustained or not), seems dubious
proof of a widespread practice, even in a small community. See Kerr v. City of West
Palm Beach, 875 F.2d 1546, 1555 (11th Cir. 1989) (comparing injury rate within canine
units of other municipalities); Sarus v. Rotundo, 831 F.2d 397, 401 (2d Cir. 1987)
(holding that no unconstitutional practice was shown by number of complaints); Bry-
ant v. Whalen, 759 F. Supp. 410, 412 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (statistical evidence of complaint/
sustained rate in Chicago is not sufficient); Burnette v. Ciolino, 750 F. Supp. 1562,
1564-65 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (plaintiff bears burden of demonstrating a "history of wide-
spread abuse" and summary judgment is appropriate where plaintiff points to five
shootings in five years); McKenna v. County of Clayton, 657 F. Supp. 221. 225 (N.D.
Ga. 1987) ("The mere existence" of "common occurrences" such as previous false
arrest claims does not establish a failure to adequately investigate unless the plaintiff
shows they were resolved against the employer on the merits).
120.
The jury was instructed that there had never been any authoritative find-
ing as to whether or not any claimant's charge was valid and that the jury
was neither to assume that the claims were true nor to try to assess their
truth; rather, the jury was merely to "focus [its] attention on [whether] the
chief of police and/or the city [took] sufficient steps in their supervisory ca-
pacity in handling those claims."
Fiacco, 783 F.2d at 328; see also Sango v. City of New York, No. 83 CV 5177, 1989 WL
86995, *10 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 1989) (holding that unadjudicated complaints are rele-
vant to question of adequacy of the proceedings).
121. See Fiacco, 783 F.2d at 328.
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lice department, and the town had adopted rules to govern the de-
partment and discipline officers, Police Chief Stark had never seen
those rules. 122 The Board provided no form on which a civilian
could file a complaint against an officer. 123 Fiacco offered evidence
that seven written complaints had been filed with Chief Stark, that
the police chief typically took no written statements from the com-
plainants, that he did not open any formal investigation, and that
he did not make any notations in officer files concerning the com-
plaints. 24 No hearings had ever been held.125 Instead, the chief
testified that "he had conducted as much investigation as he
thought necessary.' ' 26
The chief testified that there had been other complaints against
officers and, after investigating those complaints he discharged
three officers. 127 Rensselaer attempted to show through this evi-
dence that its informal investigation and discipline process was ad-
equate and resulted in appropriate discipline. The court, however,
found the informal process completely inadequate. Rensselaer's
problems were compounded by the mayor's lack of response.
While the mayor was informed of all complaints, he condoned the
failure to prepare formal reports or submit the complaints to the
Public Safety Board. 28 Thus, rather than a negligently adminis-
tered program, the policymakers for the town deliberately ignored
the town's duly enacted citizen complaint procedure. Rejecting
Renneselaer's defense of its informal process, the court concluded
that, "the evidence was sufficient as a matter of law to permit a
rational juror to find that the City had a policy of nonsupervision of
its police officers that amounted to a deliberate indifference to
their use of excessive force.' '1 29
Plaintiff's causation evidence was not particularly well-defined,
most likely because the case was decided before the edicts of Can-
ton and Brown that plaintiffs must establish and test the affirmative
link between the misconduct and the municipality's indifference.
However, plaintiff did establish that at least one of the misbehaving
officers was the subject of previous complaints. In addition, be-
cause of the informality of the complaint process, little or no inves-
122. See id. at 329.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 329-30.
125. See id. at 330.
126. Id.
127. See id. at 331.
128. See id.
129. Id. at 332.
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tigation of the officer's past misconduct occurred. The officer was
also promoted to sergeant without past claims being fully investi-
gated or adjudicated. It seems likely, therefore, that even after
Canton and Brown, Fiacco's evidence "directly tested the link be-
tween" the deficiencies in the complaint system and the miscon-
duct of that officer. 130 The court concluded that a jury rationally
could have inferred that:
[w]ith no formal statement being taken from the complainant,
no file being created, no notation being made in the officer's
file, and no further investigation being made-[the process]
would have been viewed by the officers, and should be viewed
by an objective observer, as reflecting indifference by the City to
the use of excessive force.' 31
Fiacco proved that an inadequate system for responding to citizen
grievances promoted a climate of unconstitutional misconduct as
well as an inference that this lawless climate was affirmatively
linked to the misconduct at issue.
An informal complaint review procedure also failed the citizens
of Utica, New York. The court's particular criticisms regarding
Utica are noteworthy and instructive. 32 In Hogan v. Franco,133 a
claim for excessive force was made against several Utica officers
following the plaintiff's arrest when he resisted officers attempting
to confiscate his alcohol at a public fireworks display.13  Arresting
officers beat the plaintiff with a baton and refused to grant medical
attention until the next day despite pleas from other arrestees on
his behalf. 135 As one basis of municipal liability, plaintiff alleged
130. Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1392.
131. Fiacco, 783 F.2d at 331.
132. An earlier case against Utica found no liability. In Sarus v. Rotundo, 831 F.2d
397 (2d Cir. 1987), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a jury verdict
against Utica. The court noted multiple avenues to complain about police (the mayor,
the Public Safety Commission, and the chief) although complaints eventually fun-
neled to the chief. Importantly, Chief Rotundo testified that he routinely disciplined
based upon investigations. Id. at 401. The court cautioned, "[w]hile a more formal
process might be preferred, appellees offered no evidence that the Utica procedures
differed in any way from those employed by other municipalities." Id. Although de-
cided before Canton, the court followed the deliberate indifference standard, relying
on Fiacco. Id. Put in the context of Canton, the claim in Sarus apparently failed
because plaintiff failed to prove that the informal complaint review procedure in
Utica was deficient and the need for formality obvious. Canton, 489 U.S. at 390.
133. See Sarus, 896 F. Supp. 1313 (N.D.N.Y. 1995). The Sarus claim arose from
events in 1984. 831 F.2d at 398. The Hogan injuries occurred in 1992. See Hogan, 896
F. Supp. at 1316.
134. See Hogan, 896 F. Supp. at 1316.
135. See id.
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that Utica's general failure to investigate citizen complaints evi-
denced deliberate indifference amounting to a policy or practice of
failing to properly supervise or discipline officers. 136  Equipped
with detailed information about supervision in Utica and a cogent
theory, the court examined Utica's system for reviewing citizen
complaints. 137
The court agreed with the plaintiff that the failure to institute
adequate civilian complaint procedures was evidence of inadequate
supervision and could lead to injuries such as the excessive force
injuries he suffered. 138 As to the complaint process specifically, the
Hogan court first faulted the manner in which past complaints
were investigated and resolved.139 In contrast to testimony in an
earlier case,"4 ° where Police Chief Rotundo testified to "previous
disciplinary actions and a system of handling complaints that did
not give him sole discretion[,]' 141 in Hogan, he testified that: "the
police department has no formal procedures for handling com-
plaints of police brutality;.., the police department does not index
such complaints; ... informal investigations are conducted by fel-
low officers . . 142 at the discretion of the chief. 43 The court
found that the investigation of the Hogan incident evidenced "pur-
poseful intolerance" from a department which "arrogantly refused
to search for answers, accepted without question denials by in-
volved officers, and concluded that the claims were not only un-
136. See id. at 1318. In addition to excessive force by beating, Hogan also com-
plained that being jostled in the back of the van while handcuffed and unable to stabi-
lize himself amounted to excessive force, and deliberate indifference to medical
needs. He also prevailed on a claim that the failure-to-train drivers to secure prison-
ers against injury in the vans, that the failure to provide medical attention, and the
failure-to-train officers in use of force each constituted deliberate indifference. See id.
at 1316, 1322, 1323.
137. The court applied Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 507 U.S. 961 (1993), requiring conscious indifference of policymakers to
the inadequacy of the program. In this failure-to-train case, the court required plain-
tiff to prove that a policymaker "knows to a moral certainty" officers will confront a
given situation and that the failure-to-train will frequently lead officers making the
wrong choice and to a deprivation of civil rights. Hogan, 896 F. Supp. at 1321 (quot-
ing Walker, 974 F.2d at 297).
138. See Hogan, 896 F. Supp. at 1323.
139. Id. at 1320 ("Trial testimony indicated that the informal investigation proce-
dures consisted of a supervising officer asking the officer who was the subject of the
complaint to submit a statement on special report Utica Police Department Form
61.").
140. See Sarus v. Rotundo, 831 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1987).
141. See Hogan, 896 F. Supp. at 1323.
142. Id. at 1317.
143. See id. at 1323.
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resolved, but unsubstantiated. ' 144 From the court's perspective,
the complaint review process had deteriorated from the earlier
case: "[c]ontrary to the situation in Sarus, there is no longer a Pub-
lic Safety Commissioner to handle citizen complaints or to intro-
duce new police policy.... Chief Rotunda is now responsible for
the supervision of the police, and the informal investigation de-
scribed above is the result.' '1 45
The court faulted Utica's failure to index the complaints by of-
ficers' names or to place them in officers' personnel files even
when unsubstantiated.146 The court noted that indexing complaints
is recommended by the New York State Commission on Criminal
Justice and the Use of Force and that "lack of indexing may be a
factor of inadequate supervision if supported by other evi-
dence. 1 47 The court criticized Utica's maintenance of complaints
in alphabetical order by complainant. While the process protected
an officer's personnel file from the "smear" of "unsubstantiated
complaints," the court explained that this indicated "silent support
and protection," a "lack of supervision," and "deliberate indiffer-
ence to the truth.'1 48
144. Id. at 1320.
145. Id. at 1323. No mention was made of whether the other sources investigating
complaints in Utica remained intact. See Brown v. City of Margate, 842 F. Supp. 515
(S.D. Fl. 1993) (holding that informal resolution of complaints without written docu-
mentation is sufficient to establish deliberate indifference).
146. See Hogan, 896 F. Supp. at 1320; infra note 147. Regardless of the complaint
review system employed, record keeping policies may raise issues of inadequacy.
Compare Brown, 842 F. Supp. at 516 n.2 ("The City must, however, acknowledge that
allegations of a police department's failure to maintain thorough and accurate records
of citizen complaints-if substantiated-could be considered evidence of deliberate
indifference.") with Bosley v. Foster, No. Civ. A. 90-2409-L, 1992 WL 40696, at *2 (D.
Kan. Feb. 5,1992) (holding that the destruction of records of unfounded complaints
after six months, well-founded claims after two year statute of limitations is not an
unconstitutional policy, nor can plaintiff establish an affirmative link between destruc-
tion and injury suffered).
147. Hogan, 896 F. Supp. at 1324. Hogan is not alone in criticizing the failure to
index pending and even unsustained complaints. Other courts have complained that
the failure to place pending or unsustained complaints in an officer's personnel record
or to otherwise track and monitor them prevents the municipality from recognizing
early patterns of abuse. See, e.g., Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 973 (3d Cir.
1996) (reversing judgment in favor of Pittsburgh: "each complaint was insulated from
other prior and similar complaints and treated in a vacuum"); Vann v. City of New
York, 72 F.3d 1040, 1045 (2d Cir. 1995); Cox v. District of Columbia, 821 F. Supp. 1,
15 (D.D.C. 1993), affd, 40 F.3d 475 (DC. Cir. 1994). But see Brooks v. Scheib, 813
F.2d 1191, 1194 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that court will not mandate policy requiring
examination of prior complaints).
148. Hogan, 896 F. Supp. at 1319-21.
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Utica's informal complaint system, evidence of the inadequacy
of the investigation in plaintiff's own case, the town's failure to in-
dex complaints and anecdotal evidence149 of alleged past miscon-
duct were sufficient evidence of deliberate indifference to support
municipal liability. 5 ° The systematic failure to investigate prior
complaints convinced the court that: "[t]he inference that a policy
existed may ... be drawn from circumstantial proof, such as...
evidence that the municipality had notice of but repeatedly failed
to make any meaningful investigation into charges that police of-
ficers had used excessive force in violation of the complainants'
civil rights."'1 51
This case suggests that courts may be willing to infer that prior
complaints, without regard to their validity, coupled with a faulty
system of investigation, suffice to prove a municipality's failure to
supervise police officers.
Like Fiacco, Hogan also lacked direct evidence by which to an-
swer the question, "would the injury have been avoided ... [if] the
program . . . was not deficient in the identified respect[?]"'1 2 In-
stead, the court concluded the jury could infer that the injury was a
consequence of failing to supervise:
Regardless of whether the investigation would find [the police
officers] responsible for the assault upon Hogan, its undertaking
was necessary to convey a policy strongly discouraging such acts.
Yet policymaking personnel accomplished exactly the opposite,
conveying a strong statement of support for civil rights viola-
. tions by their tolerance of these violations. Their refusal to root
out the culprits . .. issues a shout of support for such actions
without a word spoken.' 3
149. The court credited the testimony of other victims of alleged abuse and an
emergency room physician who claimed to have treated victims of past abuse. "The
evidence introduced was sufficient to show a problematic number and regularity of
complaints...." Id. at 1324.
150. See id. The court makes no mention of sustained complaints or proven inci-
dents of past misconduct, an element the Sarus court found critical. See Sarus, 831
F.2d at 397, 402 (finding no evidence of past incidents "viewed as essential in Fiacco"
and court was "loath to affirm a finding of a policy of indifference when not even a
single incident of other misconduct was presented"). However, the Hogan court ap-
parently dismissed the need for proof of prior misconduct, implying that because of
inferior investigation of citizen complaints one could not infer a lack of prior miscon-
duct. See Hogan, 896 F. Supp. at 1325.
151. Hogan, 896 F. Supp. at 1320 (quoting Ricciuti v. New York City Transit Auth.,
941 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1991) (omission in original)).
152. Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391 (1989).
153. Hogan, 896 F. Supp. at 1320.
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Like Fiacco, Hogan used proof of a climate of lawlessness to create
the inference that the system's failure caused the instant injury.
Other lessons can be drawn from Fiacco and Hogan. These
cases demonstrate a dissatisfaction with informal complaint sys-
tems in which the responsibility for receiving and investigating
complaints resides with an individual vested with unbridled discre-
tion to pursue complaints or not. These communities pay the price
for the judicially perceived shortcomings of their chief of police.154
Hogan also foreshadows an emerging judicial expectation: all
complaints (not merely sustained complaints) against officers
should be indexed and noted in officer personnel files so that re-
peated complaints yield data about an officer's overall perform-
ance. While each misconduct complaint may be judged in the
vacuum of impartiality, an officer's overall performance must be
judged in the context of his or her past performance.' 5 Experts
suggest that multiple complaints, regardless of the adjudicatory
outcome, may suggest officers require additional supervision, mon-
itoring, or retraining.1 5 6 Thus, courts expect that the system will
potentially identify problem officers from patterns of past com-
plaints and act to protect the public.
2. Internal Affairs
Police departments employing internal affairs units to investigate
civilian complaints are subject to criticisms that the internal investi-
gations are perfunctory or biased, especially when a police chief
directly supervises the investigators or affords them little indepen-
dence. 157 Moreover, lodging complaints against police to the police
154. See e.g., Carney v. White, 843 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Wis. 1994) (holding that
Village of Darien may be liable where police committee did not monitor the internal
complaint process), aff'd, 60 F.3d 1273 (7th Cir. 1995); Brown v. City of Margate, 842
F. Supp. 515, 518 (S.D. Fla. 1993) ("The City admitted that prior to 1988 citizen com-
plaints were routinely disposed of orally with no record kept of the complaint nor any
documentation made of any investigation that was conducted."), aff'd, 56 F.3d 1390
(11th Cir. 1995). An informal system may be successfully defended, however, when
the policymakers are responsive. See Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069, 1074 (8th Cir.
1996) (describing case in which police chief brought misconduct to the attention of the
city council promptly and requested immediate termination; three prior incidents
were also met with swift termination).
155. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
156. See infra note 232 and accompanying text.
157. See Alison Patton, The Endless Cycle of Abuse: Why 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Is Inef-
fective in Deterring Police Brutality, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 794 (1993) (discussing in-
ternal affairs investigations posing a serious potential for bias, cover-up and
unfairness).
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department itself may be viewed as intimidating by the public.15 8
Without a nondepartmental unit for receiving citizen complaints,
internal affairs systems are subject to allegations that they actively
discourage complainants from coming forward through threats, in-
timidation, and reprisals. If a system discourages complaints by
fostering fear, the system is patently deficient.
Parrish v. Luckie159 is notable both for its assessment of the in-
ternal affairs complaint system and the direct link plaintiff proved
between the municipality's non-supervision vis-a-vis its defective
complaint procedures and -the particular injury suffered. The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a verdict in favor of
plaintiff Parrish for false arrest and sexual assault against the City
of North Little Rock, Arkansas. Following her arrest, Ms. Parrish
was forced to perform oral sex on the arresting officer, Luckie. 6 °
She complained to Officer Dallas about Luckie. Dallas in turn re-
ported back to Luckie. Luckie told Dallas "not to report the inci-
dent to his supervisor because he knew that if a written complaint
was not filed, the Department would not investigate.' 16 1 There
was evidence of prior incidents of misconduct involving Luckie. 62
The plaintiff did file a written report about the incident and Luckie
was eventually charged and convicted of first degree sexual
abuse. 63
As to the deficiencies in the complaint system, the court agreed
with the jury's conclusion that the police department under the di-
rection of its police chief "implemented a policy of avoiding, ignor-
ing, and covering up complaints of physical and sexual abuse.' '1 64
The internal affairs division in North Little Rock did not select
cases for investigation independently but was solely controlled by
the chief:
Chief Bruce created and maintained a system in which he was
the only person who could open an internal affairs investigation.
Chief Bruce maintained a policy of opening investigations only
when citizens filed written complaints. After Chief Bruce
opened an' investigation, he controlled its scope and direction.
Investigators would report to Chief Bruce as to whether the
written complaint was substantiated or unsubstantiated.
158. See infra note 166.
159. 963 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1992).
160. See id. at 203.
161. Id.
162. See id. at 204.
163. See id.
164. Id. at 203.
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Evidence also showed that the Department required citizens fil-
ing written complaints against officers to submit a statement
under oath and to sign a statement that they understood Arkan-
sas' felony statute regarding false swearing. Investigators also
discouraged citizens from filing complaints by telling persons
that if the investigator believed they were not telling the truth,
they might be prosecuted and fined or imprisoned.1 65
The court agreed with the plaintiff that this internal affairs proce-
dure intimidated citizens and made them reluctant to file com-
plaints. 166 Therefore, the absence of complaints did not indicate an
absence of misconduct within the force. Instead, the court inferred
that officers operating under this system could "act with impunity
unless a citizen filed a written complaint. 167
Most importantly, Parrish demonstrates an effective method to
prove that the municipality's faulty complaint review system di-
rectly permitted a particular officer to violate a citizen's constitu-
tional rights. Here, evidence showed that Officer Luckie knew that
if he could convince fellow officers not to file written reports, and
could intimidate complainants from coming forward, he could es-
cape investigation and discipline. Thus, the inadequacy of the com-
plaint process allowed Luckie repeatedly to violate the
constitution, and Luckie was aware of the lack of consequences for
misconduct. The affirmative link, required by Brown and Canton,
was quite strong.
165. Id. at 204-205. This is not an uncommon procedure. Regardless of the system,
the hope is that sworn complaints curb false complaints, however, the procedure may
also discourage valid ones:
Civilian review boards have varying procedures, some of which are subject
to the same criticisms as are police investigatory process. For example, a
body calling itself a "civilian review board" in Richmond, California, re-
quires complainants to sign complaints and gives a stern warning about the
prosecution of false statements. Not unlike the police officers' bill of rights
in Maryland, this procedure can be criticized on the grounds that it is intimi-
dating to citizens. It quashes one of the arguments put forth historically in
favor of civilian review.
PEREZ, supra note 15, at 130.
166. The fear of complaining is particularly problematic to internal complaint mod-
els. See Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 565 (1st Cir. 1989) ("The
investigations of complaints against officers required witnesses to come to the station
house to give sworn written statements .... [T]he effect of such a requirement was to
'frighten[ ] most of the average citizen[s] .... This hampered the department's ability
to discover the truth surrounding alleged incidents of misconduct.") However, as Pe-
rez notes, civilian review can apply similarly stifling requirements. PEREZ, supra note
15, at 130.
167. Parrish, 963 F.2d at 205.
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Nonetheless, an internal affairs system is not a necessarily fatal
choice leading inevitably to municipal liability. In Brooks v.
Scheib, 6 s the plaintiff alleged a constitutional injury against an At-
lanta police officer and also complained that the city failed to su-
pervise its officers adequately, specifically attacking the internal
citizen complaint review process. 16 9 The Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed a jury verdict against Atlanta, finding plaintiff's
evidence insufficient to support the verdict. 7 ° As to the plaintiff's
"complain[t] about the failure to have a citizens' review committee
or other outside involvement in the complaint process,' 171 the
court explained that the plaintiff lacked evidence that "police of-
ficers cannot be fair and objective in judging complaints against
other officers.' 1 72 Unlike in Parrish, the Brooks plaintiff offered
no evidence to show that the police actively discouraged complain-
ants from making complaints or that the police chief exercised uni-
lateral control over the investigation.
Brooks also asserted that the large number of complaints against
the officer involved demonstrated Atlanta's deliberate indiffer-
ence, even if some of those complaints were pending or unsus-
tained. 73 The court rejected this contention. It held that it was
improper for the jury to infer that the city had knowledge of mis-
conduct from the number of complaints alone. 74 After all, the
court explained, the officer worked in a high crime area where ar-
restees frequently complain "as a means of harassing officers who
arrest them.' 1 75 As to the failure to index complaints by officer
name, the court commented that while such a practice might be
168. 813 F.2d 1191 (11th Cir. 1987).
169. See id. at 1193. Plaintiff pointed to three specific deficiencies with regard to
the internal complaint process: 1) the failure to have a written policy requiring that
past complaints be brought to the attention of investigators of fresh complaints; 2)
failure to administer polygraphs to officers involved in complaints; 3) failure to have a
policy giving citizens a role in the complaint review process. See id. at 1194.
170. See id. at 1195.
171. Id. at 1194.
172. Id. at 1194; see also Perez, supra note 15, at 115.
173. See Brooks, 813 F.2d at 1194. Perez reports that most police receive one or
fewer complaints per year and that a typical officer receives between two and four
complaints over their career. See PEREZ, supra note 15, at 29.
174. See id. at 1193 ("City presented testimony that each complaint was fully inves-
tigated and found to be lacking in merit"). Perez cautions that errant officers do not
necessarily receive the most complaints, "these ideas do not square with the realities
of the reports of police misconduct .... [i]ndividual patterns and career histories are
far more complex than such simple analysis implies." PEREZ, supra note 15, at 30.
175. Id. at 1193; see also Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 975 (quoting Straus
v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765, 768-69 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that people file com-
plaints against the police "for many reasons, or for no reason at all")).
19981
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXV
helpful, it would not "mandate a policy which would require that
prior complaints always be examined."' 76 The court recognized
that Atlanta might be liable if the plaintiff could prove "that more
effective citizens' complaint procedures would have prevented his
injuries.' 7 However, plaintiff failed to do so.
Proving internal systems lack legitimacy and integrity requires
more than vague inferences that the system is necessarily biased
merely because it is an internal system. 178 Canton requires far
more.179 Over eighty percent of municipal police departments rely
on an internal affairs model to review citizen complaints.18 0 In Par-
rish, the plaintiff provided a narrowly-crafted allegation that the
internal affairs system actively discouraged complainants from
coming forward and that complaints received only cursory investi-
gation in a system designed to cover up more than it revealed.
Moreover, Parrish proved that the faulty system was a likely factor
in Officer Luckie's tendency toward misconduct based on a review
of Luckie's past record.
The perceived lack of integrity and legitimacy' 8' within informal
and internal affairs systems may lead judges and juries to infer that
misconduct within a department likely goes unchecked. Yet
Brooks demonstrates that a plaintiff must muster more than a mere
inference of bias to prove deliberate indifference. 8 2
3. Civilian Review Procedures
Participation by civilians in the review of complaints against po-
lice may eliminate the perception that investigations are biased and
self-serving. Chief among the strengths of civilian review are per-
ceptions of independence and integrity. Although the perception
176. Brooks, 813 F.2d at 1194; see supra note 147 and accompanying text.
177. Brooks, 813 F.2d at 1195. Brooks is notable because it is one of few decisions
expressing skepticism concerning the "provability" of a narrowly crafted allegation
that a defective complaint procedure caused a constitutional injury, recognizing Har-
ris's edict not to second-guess communities. Id. at 1194.
178. See PEREZ, supra note 15, at 114-115 (stating that internal affairs can be "ex-
tremely effective in influencing police behavior" and "clean[ing] house").
179. See Chudzik v. City of Wilmington, 809 F. Supp. 1142, 1149 (D. Del. 1992)
(holding that "sweeping" generalizations that internal affairs system is inadequate is
insufficient to oppose summary judgment-plaintiff, as a complaining witness at inter-
nal affairs hearing, was permitted opportunity to witness hearing but not to confront
witnesses or be represented by counsel).
180. See supra note 41.
181. See PEREZ, supra note 15.
182. See id. ("The classic internal review model is not at all as sinister as has been
asserted by external observers. The deterrent effects of internal investigative mecha-
nisms are significant.").
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
of integrity and legitimacy of investigations of citizen grievances
against officers may be restored by independent civilian review,183
such a system also raises efficiency problems. Further, if the civil-
ian review process does not interface with other departments and
have an impact on personnel decisions, then the review does not
yield meaningful results. Communities transitioning to civilian re-
view should find the District of Columbia's disastrous experience
instructive.
The District of Columbia enjoyed an early litigation success fol-
lowing implementation of a civilian review board to hear citizen
complaints against officers. 184 Its success was short-lived. 185 The
failure to investigate citizen complaints and discipline officers as a
species of failure to supervise was advanced a second time as a
basis of municipal liability in Cox v. District of Columbia.86 In
Cox, the plaintiff alleged unconstitutional use of force by Officer
Goodwin. Officer Goodwin had against him several prior com-
plaints of excessive force. At least one of those incidents had oc-
curred during his probationary service, when, had the complaint
been decided against Goodwin, Goodwin could easily have been
terminated. 8 7 However, the plaintiff was able to prove that, be-
cause of a woefully inadequate complaint review procedure, Of-
ficer Goodwin remained on the force while his conduct went
unchecked and his probationary period on the force expired.
In most respects, the plaintiff's deliberate indifference claim was
similar to Fiacco's: that the citizen review system was fundamen-
tally flawed and that the resulting failure to discipline officers as-
sured continued constitutional deprivations. Cox demonstrates
that the case against a municipality can be proven in large cities as
well as in small towns. As in Fiacco, not only did the plaintiff
demonstrate that there were past complaints, but also that the mu-
183. See id. at 142-56.
184. Prior to 1982, citizen complaints were handled through an internal process.
See Cox v. District of Columbia, 821 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1993) (describing develop-
ment of the Civilian Complaint Review Board), affd, 40 F.3d 475 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
185. In Carter v. District of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116 (D.C. Cir. 1986), a civil rights
plaintiff offered a mixture of evidence to support a claim of a pattern of excessive
force against the District of Columbia. The Carter plaintiff failed to adequately attack
the procedure for reviewing complaints, instead attempting to show that the number
of complaints and the sustained complaint rate was circumstantial evidence of a cus-
tom or policy of misconduct. A directed verdict was entered in favor of the munici-
pality and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed. The court
found that the statistics alone were "wanting in detail" and plaintiff lacked a cogent
theory of the District's deficiencies. Id. at 122-5.
186. 821 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1993), affd, 40 F.3d 475 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
187. See id. at 9.
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nicipality did not have an effective system to address the com-
plaints. Moreover, the plaintiff in Cox also showed that complaints
against the police officer in question went unanswered and that he
remained on the force while the complaints were languishing in the
city's bureaucracy. As Canton and Brown demand, Cox also
proved a link between the deficient program and the injury by
demonstrating the officer continued in municipal service without
discharge or discipline.
In Cox, the plaintiff offered evidence188 that the District of Co-
lumbia's complaint review process for its Metropolitan Police De-
partment was inadequate due to an ever-increasing backlog. For
example, the plaintiff offered evidence that in 1983 the average
time required to dispose of a complaint was eight months, but by
1990 the time had increased to 33.10 months.189 The plaintiff
demonstrated:
At the end of its first five years of existence, the CCRB [Civilian
Complaint Review Board] had received a total of 1,742 com-
plaints and had a backlog of approximately 1,000 cases. Of the
1,742 cases filed, the CCRB had made findings on the merits in
only 145 cases, sustaining at least one allegation of misconduct
in 65 of those 145 cases.' 90
According to the court, the District of Columbia mandated that
all cases be brought before the CCRB prior to disciplining officers;
thus, the CCRB's deficiencies assured officers went undisciplined
for years. 191 The District of Columbia responded to the backlog by
increasing the budget of the CCRB (although not necessarily to the
level requested), but the backlog proved intractable. 192 To the mu-
nicipality's credit, in 1991 CCRB requested permission to increase
its capacity to hear complaints by establishing a panel system. In
1992 the District of Columbia Council finally adopted panels,
mediators, and an "Early Warning Tracking System" to identify of-
188. See Cox, 821 F. Supp. at 3. The case procedure was unusual. Plaintiffs de-
faulted police officer defendants in 1991. The District of Columbia and Plaintiff
agreed to submit the case without trial, filing a joint stipulation of facts, individual
statements of evidence, individual proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law
and briefs. See id.
189. See id. at 6.
190. See id. at 7 (footnotes omitted). Furthermore, the CCRB processed less than
one-third of the complaints received. See id.
191. See id. at 6.
192. See id. at 7.
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ficers involved in three or more citizen complaints within two
years. 1
93
The Cox court noted that under Canton, "a city's complete fail-
ure to maintain an adequate system of disciplining officers who act
unconstitutionally might 'fairly be said to represent a policy for
which the city is responsible, and for which the city may be held
liable if it actually causes injury. '"'194 The court framed the issue:
Accordingly, the next step is to determine whether the consis-
tent and chronic delays endemic to the District of Columbia's
civilian complaint review process constituted a policy or custom
and whether maintenance of that policy or custom amounted to
deliberate indifference by the District to its residents or to any
other individuals who might come in contact with District police
officers.195
The court distinguished the quality of proof from an earlier case, 96
explaining that "[t]o establish a pattern, policy or custom, a plain-
tiff must present 'concentrated, fully packed, precisely delineated
scenarios' of unconstitutional conduct."1 97 Acknowledging that
this proof "is not easy to quantify,"'198 the court concluded that
"Cox has firmly demonstrated a pattern on the part of the District
of maintaining a complaint and disciplinary procedure so ineffec-
tive so as to virtually constitute a nullity, and, at the very least,
deliberate indifference. '" 199 Moreover, Cox demonstrated "that the
District of Columbia did maintain, and indeed advance, a custom
of egregiously delayed investigations."2 ° The deleterious effects of
the delays were compounded by the CCRB's role as the "exclusive
receptacle for citizen complaints. '20  Worse, the delay resulted in
failure to eliminate troublesome probationary officers, thus thwart-
ing the purpose of the probationary period.20 2 Finally, Cox
presented a logical theory of statistical relevance: due to the egre-
193. See id. at 9.
194. See id. at 12. (quoting Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989)).
195. Id. at 12.
196. See Carter v. Disrict of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116, 125 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
197. Id. at 13 (quoting Parker v. District of Columbia, 850 F.2d 708, 712 (D.C. Cir.
1988)); see also Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 975 (3d Cir. 1996) (explaining
that statistical evidence coupled with actual written complaints is sufficient evidence
from which to draw inference that procedures are inadequate).
198. Cox, 821 F. Supp. at 13.
199. Id. at 14.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See id. at 15. Moreover, the CCRB failed to comply with its own statutory
deadlines (a thirty day requirement). See id.
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gious delays (and static number of cases resolved) complaints
against officers rose, presumably as a result of a failure to discipline
and dismiss aberrant officers.20 3 Because of the lack of discipline
(a consequence of delays), the court concluded that the District of
Columbia's deliberate indifference to disciplining officers assured
constitutional injuries would continue. °4
Of some comfort to cash-strapped municipalities, the court
noted that it was not implying that the District of Columbia should
merely continue to throw increasing amounts of money at its
flawed system (nor that merely increasing funding would be suffi-
cient). Rather, the court suggested that "non-monetary alterna-
tives" such as prioritization might suffice to remedy the failing
system.2 °5 Cox serves as a warning to large cities that while civilian
review boards may serve important public interests, to the extent
that their operation creates delays and inefficiencies in the overall
disciplinary system, they must be redesigned or supplemented with
simultaneous, parallel internal review and discipline. Arguably,
the District of Columbia's primary problem arose because the civil-
ian review board was the "sole receptacle for citizen complaints ' '2 6
and that discipline was delayed pending outcome of the board's
review.20 7 As a result of the system's delays, the District of Colum-
bia failed to take corrective action and officers gained permanent
employment status in the department while awaiting hearings on
alleged misconduct.20 8
In addition to liability based upon inefficiencies within the citi-
zen board system, the manner in which the civilian review system is
designed to investigate complaints may also expose municipalities
to liability just as an internal system might. For example, in Sango
v. City of New York, °9 the plaintiffs successfully claimed that the
abuses against them resulted from a faulty disciplinary system,
marred by cursory investigations and inadequate cross-examina-
203. See id. at 16 nn.15, 17.
204. See id. at 16.
205. Id. at 17 n.19 (explaining that "the Court does not suggest that a particular
sum of money should have been or should now be appropriated to address citizen
complaints.., other non-monetary alternatives could have been implemented").
206. Id. at 14.
207. See id. at 6.
208. Courts are particularly intolerant of municipalities that permit promotions and
other personnel actions to go forward while complaints (especially multiple com-
plaints) are pending. See Vann v. City of New York, 72 F.3d 1040, 1050 (2d Cir. 1995);
Cox, 821 F. Supp. at 15.
209. No. 83 CV 5177, 1989 WL 86995 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 1989).
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tion of police witnesses. 210 A magistrate's report agreed with plain-
tiff's assessment that the investigations and the proceedings
conducted by the review board were inadequate.2  Thus, like in-
ternal review, civilian review does not ensure thorough or rigorous
investigations and may be similarly faulted for a lack of investiga-
tory thoroughness. Worse, the civilian investigators may lack the
competency of a police investigators.21 2
210. Id. at *13. New York City's system ultimately subjects complaints to an eight
member civilian panel. Id. at *4. Perez categorizes New York City's system as a hy-
brid system, with roles for both police and civilian monitors. PEREZ, supra note 15, at
166. New York is currently considering creating an Independent Police Investigation
and Audit Board with authority to subpoena, investigate, audit and refer cases to the
prosecutor. This independent board would compliment, not eliminate, the Civilian
Complaint Review Board. See Dan Janison, Cop Watchdog/New Panel is end-run on
Rudy, NEWSDAY, Oct. 1, 1997 at A28.
211. Sango, 1989 WL 86995, at *3. Despite a three level complaint review proce-
dure, a Magistrate's Report found that the Civilian Complaint Review Board's inves-
tigation of complaints against the officer were "less than adequate." Id. The report
criticized the investigations and hearings, noting "brief questioning" and lack of vigor-
ous cross examination of the officer, failure to interview witnesses or in some cases, a
failure to document how investigations were conducted. Without success, the City
attempted to rebut the evidence with proof that the overall system was adequate,
citing an overall 10% "substantiated" claims rate. The court rejected its argument
stating, "it simply cannot be said that the percentage identified so conclusively dem-
onstrates plaintiffs' inability to establish inadequate investigations amounting to delib-
erate indifference that summary judgment against plaintiffs is warranted." Id. at *12.
See Dan Morrison, Brutality Blind/Safir: Couldn't Predict Precinct Torture, NEWSDAY,
Sept. 12, 1997 at A8 (following incident of egregious brutality, Mayor plans to provide
additional funds to hire more experienced investigators for the Civilian Complaint
Review Board).
212. See PEREZ, supra note 15, at 143; Jones, supra note 39, at 517. Beck v. City of
Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966 (3rd Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. . 1086 (1997), highlights
the fact that civilian systems can experience the same deficiencies as internal systems.
There, the Office of Professional Standards ("OPS") investigated complaints against
police officers. Id. at 968. Perez identifies Pittsburgh as an example of a hybrid sys-
tem, with roles for police and civilian investigators. See PEREZ, supra note 15, at 263.
In reversing summary judgment in favor of Pittsburgh, the court faulted determina-
tions made in a vacuum, lack of rigorous investigation, and lack of tracking officers.
The OPS itself was structured to curtail disciplinary action and stifle investi-
gations into the credibility of the City's police officers. Even if complain-
ant's witnesses were credible, their testimony became inert under OPS
policy, while at the same time police officers' statements appeared to have
been given special, favorable consideration.
Because there is no formalized tracking of complaints for individual officers,
a jury could find that officers are guaranteed repeated impunity, so long as
they do not put themselves in a position to be observed by someone other
than another police officer.
Beck, 89 F.3d at 974.
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Even if complaints are adequately and professionally investi-
gated and resolved promptly, determinations under any system
must result in discipline when appropriate.213 Unlike internal or
informal systems closely connected to the chief and the depart-
ment, external, civilian systems must develop a method to commu-
nicate with the internal police departments. In order to impact
personnel decisions, the actions of a civilian review board must in-
terface with those charged with supervision and discipline of of-
ficers. In Vann v. City of New York,214 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed a decision granting summary judgment to New
York based in part on a claim that an inadequate complaint review
procedure demonstrated deliberate indifference regarding supervi-
sion of abusive police officers.215 The court explained that deliber-
ate indifference could be found "if the complaints are followed by
no meaningful attempt on the part of the municipality to investi-
gate or forestall further incidents. ' 216 In Vann, the plaintiff com-
plained that various units of the police department failed to
coordinate their independent knowledge of the police misconduct
of officer Raul Morrison and this failure to communicate resulted
in a failure to discipline the officer.217 In this instance, the Depart-
ment's Early Intervention Unit, which monitored problem police
officers, knew about certain misconduct by Police Officer Morri-
son.218 In addition, Morrison was referred to the Psychological
Services Unit ("PSU") for perceived deficiencies. The Civilian
Complaint Review Board received complaints about Morrison
both before and after his probationary period.219 Other depart-
ments working with problem officers, including the Department of
Advocate's Office and the Central Personnel Index also knew of
the officer's shortcomings.220 In reversing summary judgment in
favor of New York the court noted that, "[n]one of these units,
213. Typically, decisions to discipline rest finally within the department and that
fact alone should not be seen as a flaw unless recommendations are routinely ignored.
In order to hold the chief accountable one must give the chief the responsibility. See
Rudovsky, supra 26, at 497 (commenting that Civilian Review Board's recommenda-
tion of discipline should be given serious consideration); Jones, supra note 39, at 517;
West, supra note 38, at 395; PEREZ, supra note 15, at 268 (stating that a discipline
decision should reside with chief who must be held accountable).
214. 72 F.3d 1040 (2d Cir. 1995).
215. See id. at 1041.
216. Id. at 1049.
217. See id. at 1045.
218. See id. at 1042-43.
219. See id. at 1044.
220. See id.
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except PSU, attached any significance to the filing of [civilian]
complaints; and PSU did not advise those who know of the com-
plaints to pass the information on to the supervisory units."'22'
These cases instruct municipalities that no matter which system
is used to address citizen complaints, courts expect independent
and thorough investigations within a system which functions effi-
ciently and results in prompt corrective action. Personnel decisions
such as promotion from probation and promotions to a higher rank
must account for the existence and disposition of civilian com-
plaints.222 Finally, to cure pockets of abuse or system-wide abuse,
departments must chart the location of trouble spots within their
communities.223 As Cox demonstrates, courts are willing to infer
that delayed discipline means the municipality is deliberately indif-
ferent to the constitutional injuries of its citizens.
C. Negligently Administered Complaint Review Procedures
A negligently administered complaint system alone is insufficient
to hold a municipality liable under § 1983. When a plaintiff does
not allege that the system of citizen complaint review is systemi-
cally flawed or that the policymakers for the city deliberately ig-
nore procedures, the claim will fail. If the municipality adopts an
adequate system and policymakers demand its implementation,
then mere mismanagement, even if it directly results in constitu-
tional injury, will not suffice to impose municipal liability.
221. Id. at 1045. The court also noted that "commanding officers were not in-
structed to, and normally did not, report the filing of new civilian complaints. Nor did
DAO seek or receive such information from CPI or CCRB. Foppiano testified that
DAO was not concerned about the fact that a new civilian complaint had been filed
against a DAO-monitored officer unless and until the officer was found guilty." Id. at
1046.
222. In Vann, a police department psychologist explained the relevance of unsub-
stantiated complaints:
[T]he very fact that an unusual number of civilian complaints had been filed,
without regard to how they were ultimately resolved, could create concern
that the officer was experiencing psychological problems and was suffering
from stress that caused him to escalate minor situations into major
confrontations.
Vann, 72 F.3d at 1045.
223. See Rudovsky, supra note 26, at 497 (stating that civilian review boards should
have the authority "to gather statistical data relevant to patterns of abuse"); Hecker,
supra note 52, at 597-604 (recognizing that civilian review boards have the potential to
cause institutional reforms); Petterson, supra note 38, at 273 (noting civilian review's
potential to make institutional changes); see also Beck, 89 F.3d at 974-75 (noting that
police force does not make adequate use of the statistical evidence of problems it
gathers).
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Wilson v. City of Chicago224 exemplifies how Canton and Brown
require more than mere negligence on the part of municipal policy-
makers. There, the plaintiff proved, at best, a negligently adminis-
tered system of citizen complaint review. Plaintiff alleged his
confession was coerced by torture and that Chicago policymakers
tolerated such torture. Evidence revealed numerous complaints
that police abused suspects accused of injuring or murdering police
officers in a specific geographic area. The Court of Appeals for
Seventh Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of
Chicago despite strong evidence that widespread abuse took place
against these suspects. Of the quality of anecdotal evidence, the
court commented:
A rational jury could have inferred from the frequency of the
abuse, the number of officers involved in the torture of Wilson,
and the number of complaints from the black community, that
[Superintendent of Police] Brzeczek knew that officers.., were
prone to beat up suspected cop killers. Even so, if he took steps
to eliminate the practice, the fact that the steps were not effec-
tive would not establish that he had acquiesced in it and by do-
ing so adopted it as a policy of the city.225
To compound the trouble in this Chicago neighborhood, the
court concluded that, while the complaints against officers were
properly referred for investigation, they apparently were not thor-
oughly investigated. 6 The court concluded that a rational jury
might have concluded that the policymaker knew of widespread
torture by police in this particular neighborhood; however, the
court explained that this was insufficient to establish liability.22 7
The court noted that Superintendent Brzeczek referred the com-
plaints to an investigatory system that, if doing its job properly,
should have ferreted out the abusers:
It was the plaintiff's responsibility to show that in doing this
Brzeczek was not acting in good faith to extirpate the practice.
That was not shown. At worst, the evidence suggests that
Brzeczek did not respond quickly or effectively.., that he was
careless, maybe even grossly so given the volume of complaints.
More was needed to show that he approved the practice. Failing
to eliminate a practice cannot be equated to approving it.
Otherwise, every inept police chief in the country would be
224. 6 F.3d 1233 (7th Cir. 1993).
225. Id. at 1240.
226. See id. ("the office had done nothing except lose a lot of complaints").
227. See id.
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deemed to approve... the misconduct of the officers under his
command.
Deliberate or reckless indifference to complaints must be
proved in order to establish that an abusive practice has actually
been condoned and therefore can be said to have been adopted
by those responsible for making municipal policy.2 28
Unlike in Hogan and Cox, where plaintiff attacked a flawed sys-
tem of complaint review, in Wilson the municipality had developed
a procedure to hear and respond to citizen complaints. 229 Plaintiff
did not establish that the system, as designed, was inadequate to
meet the public needs. Moreover, unlike the cases involving Chief
Rotunda in Utica, Chief Bruce in North Little Rock, or Chief Stark
in Rensselaer, plaintiff could not convince a court that Chicago
policymakers permitted claims of misconduct to fall through the
cracks with deliberate indifference to their merits. The failing, ac-
cording to the court, was not a systemic deficiency but rather the
negligent administration of the program.
Monell, Canton, and Brown make clear that mere negligence is
not a basis of municipal civil rights liability. Canton specifically
cautioned that no municipal liability would attach when "an other-
wise sound program has occasionally been negligently adminis-
tered.' 2 30 Municipal policymakers must ensure that an adequate
system of civilian complaint is adopted and must deliver the
message to subordinates that the system must be implemented.
However, as Wilson demonstrates, negligent mismanagement in
the follow-through is not alone sufficient to find municipal liability.
V. What Courts Expect From Municipalities
Municipal liability for civil rights violations based upon a faulty
citizen complaint system will continue to be imposed even as more
municipalities develop elaborate, citizen complaint procedures.
Lower court decisions reflect a judicial willingness to impose cer-
tain standards for reviewing citizen complaints against police.
While this might be viewed as the judicial "second-guessing" Can-
ton eschewed, 231 a community is nevertheless well-served by reas-
228. Id.
229. See Sorlucco v. New York City Police Dep't, 971 F.2d 864, 873 (2d Cir. 1992)
(holding that expert testimony to establish pattern of failure to investigate
complaints).
230. Canton, 489 U.S. at 390.
231. Id. at 392.
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sessment of its complaint procedures in light of the increasing
claims.
An examination of the judicial criticism of various civilian com-
plaint models leads to the conclusion that to avoid liability for fail-
ure to respond effectively to citizen complaints a community
should, at a minimum:
1) adopt a formal review system regardless of the size of the
municipality;
2) provide an outside (nondepartmental) unit to receive com-
plaints so that complainants can come forward without fear
or intimidation;
3) accord investigators significant independence from the police
chief;
4) ensure professionalism in the conduct of investigations and
hearings whether conducted by police or civilians;
5) provide an opportunity for witnesses, officers, and complain-
ants each to be heard;
6) set and enforce time requirements to ensure that the review
system results in speedy resolution and discipline when
appropriate;
7) prioritize cases by the nature of the complaints so that those
suggesting public danger are addressed first;
8) index pending, sustained and unsustained complaints by indi-
vidual officer to ensure early identification of problem of-
ficers;232 and
9) take action based upon the identification of problems and
communicate the outcome of citizen complaint review to de-
partmental agencies taking other personnel action. 33
232. Even if discipline cannot be meted out for unsustained complaints, judicial
opinions suggest that many complaints in an officer's personnel file may suggest nas-
cent problems deserving evaluation and prophylactic intervention short of discipline.
In addition, multiple pending complaints may reveal a need for swift intervention.
See Beck, 89 F.3d at 974 ("[B]ecause there is no formalized tracking of complaints for
individual officers, a jury could find that officers are guaranteed repeated impunity");
Vann, 72 F.3d at 1050; Cox, 821 F. Supp. at 13-15. Placing unsustained complaints in
personnel files may conflict with collective bargaining agreements.
233. My recommendations are a result of reviewing litigation trends. However,
they are not inconsistent with the recommendations of law enforcement evaluators.
For example, the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) model policy statement,
"[w]ith regard to the complaints system itself,... stresses that it must be accessible to
all persons who wish to file a complaint, must function consistently, and must collect
and analyze misconduct complaints on a monthly basis. Additionally, it argues for a
120-day limit on the disposition of all complaints." West, supra note 38, at 398 (citing
PERF, Police Agency Handling of Citizen Complaints: A Model Policy Statement
(Washington, D.C. 1983)); Livingston, supra note 26, at 664 (recommending broader
civilian role in providing information about police performance); Hecker, supra note
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While these suggestions seem to come as much from common
sense as from judicial wisdom, surprisingly, the cases suggest that
municipalities have had difficulty implementing these standards.
So long as the federal courts are engaged in the evaluation of mu-
nicipal programs, it behooves municipalities to take note of judicial
decisions and adapt their citizen complaint procedures accordingly.
VI. Conclusion
While the Supreme Court has expressed a desire to spare federal
courts from "the endless exercise of second-guessing" which would
"implicate serious questions of federalism," '234 judicial scrutiny of
the adequacy of civilian complaint procedures employed by munic-
ipalities is increasing. Police departments of all sizes may be held
liable for poorly designed or implemented civilian complaint pro-
cedures. When these procedures fail to detect and discipline of-
ficers engaging in misconduct, the fault rests with policymakers
who act with deliberate indifference. Both internal and external
models of complaint review pose problems for police forces. Re-
cent cases instruct municipalities to formally and promptly address
citizen complaints. The litigation experience of some municipali-
ties suggests that, to avoid municipal liability, municipalities might
consider adopting a system utilizing both internal and external re-
view235 of police misconduct. At the outset, the municipality is bet-
ter served by a citizen complaint system which provides multiple
units to receive complaints. During the investigatory stage, inde-
pendence and competence are essential to creating a sense of in-
tegrity and legitimacy in the eventual outcome. At the resolution
stage, the decision must be rendered promptly and appropriate dis-
cipline delivered. Municipalities must also engage in regular evalu-
ation of their complaint procedures, or else mere supervisory
negligence will rise to deliberate indifference. Finally, municipali-
ties must systematically track complaints by officer and geographic
area, looking for patterns and pockets of misconduct within its
52, at 602 (recommending monitoring through data collection); Jones, supra note 39,
at 517 (recommending that civilian boards be empowered to make policy changes).
234. Canton, 489 U.S. at 392; see also Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 375-76 (1976)
(denying injunctive relief for alleged widespread police abuses in Philadelphia and
indicating that delicate issues of federal-state relationships would be implicated if
such relief were granted).
235. See William C. Smith & Geoffrey P. Alpert, Law Enforcement: Policing the
Defective Centurion-Decertification and Beyond, 29 CRIM. L. BULL. 147, 155-58
(1993) (advancing a decertification model for certain misconduct which should ac-
tively solicit citizen complaints as well as those internally generated).
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force. Without indexing and tracking complaints, the municipality
may be viewed as ignoring its institutional problems. Despite the
municipality's freedom from respondeat superior liability for civil
rights violations, if a municipality does not take the complaint re-
view process seriously, municipalities will be exposed to civil rights
liability for even a few bad apples.
